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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the impact of labor unionization on monitoring costs. Our findings show 
that monitoring costs are significantly higher for unionized firms. We demonstrate that the 
more complex, industrial relations structures which characterize unionized firms increase 
monitoring risks and corporate costs. We further show that monitoring agents consider political 
ideology supportive to labor unions as a parameter which enhances relevant costs. 
Additionally, we demonstrate that monitoring costs are lower in the presence of employee share 
ownership. We conclude that labor unionization increases the costs of monitoring agents, a 
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1 Introduction 
The organization of employees into unions constitutes an important aspect of the 
industrial relations architecture in the European region (Della Torre, 2019; Wallace, Tiernan, 
& White, 2006) and in other developed geographical areas (Berg, Kossek, Baird, & Block, 
2013; Boubaker, Chourou, Haddar, & Hamza, in press; Weiermair, 1987). Employing various 
theoretical perspectives (Gahan & Pekarek, 2013), scholars have, inter alia, provided insights 
into: the emergence and institutionalization of unions (Kaminska & Visser, 2011); their 
changing role and transformations (Harrisson, Roy, & Haines III, 2011); their impact on 
employee salaries (Bilginsoy, 2013; Hallock & Klein, 2016; Rios‐Avila & Hirsch, 2014; West, 
2015); as well as; their impact on core corporate matters, including efficiency, productivity, 
performance, risk-taking and strategic decision making (Hart & Sojourner, 2015; Mueller & 
Stegmaier, 2017; Volpe, 2014). 
Unionization enables employees to advance their claims to better wages, hours and 
working conditions and to extract rents (i.e., wage premiums) (Bilginsoy, 2013; Hallock & 
Klein, 2016; Panos & Theodossiou, 2013; Rios‐Avila & Hirsch, 2014; West, 2015) through 
collective bargaining, industrial action and activism (Agrawal, 2012; Chen, Chen, & Liao, 
2011b; Chyz, Leung, Li, & Rui, 2013; Faleye, Mehrotra, & Morck, 2006). However, union 
priorities and actions may cause considerable adversity, known as a “moral hazard”, which can 
harm the firm (Doucouliagos & Laroche, 2009). On this basis, prior studies have illuminated 
an underlying antithesis between the union role and shareholder wealth (Chyz, et al., 2013). 
Agency theory predicts that this antithesis, i.e., the degree of disparity between 
principal and employee interests, affects the complexity of contractual relations and, thereby, 
the level of agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Prior studies have shed some light on 
how unionization affects agency costs (Becker & Olson, 1989; Dinardo, Hallock, & Pischke, 
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1997; Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Huang, Jiang, Lie, & Que, 2017; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; 
Singh & Agarwal, 2002). However, less attention has been paid to a significant element of 
agency costs, namely monitoring costs; i.e., budget restrictions, operating rules and auditing 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 323). Given that monitoring is fundamental for corporate 
operation and development, as well as firm value, we investigate the role of unionization on 
monitoring costs. Based on prior studies, we employ a widely-accepted and well-specified 
proxy for monitoring costs: audit fees (Causholli, De Martinis, Hay, & Knechel, 2010; Ghosh 
& Tang, 2015). 
Our examination focuses on a single country so as to obtain a homogenous sample in 
terms of the underlying: financial and economic development; legal and social structure; 
politics; public infrastructure; and relevant institutional characteristics. We opt for the U.S. 
since it remains a highly-influential context and it provides a useful half-way house between 
countries where unionization is essentially not institutionalized and countries where union 
presence in corporations is dominant. U.S. unionization rates are very similar to many locales 
internationally, including many European countries1. In addition, similar to the European 
context where labor organization has remained a central issue in corporate affairs (Gourevitch, 
et al., 1985; Harvey & Turnbull, 2006; Hunter, 2006; Marchington, 1988), unionization 
remains an active agenda in the U.S. for market participants and politicians; thus, rich datasets 
are available. We employ a sample of 2,910 U.S. firm-year observations for the estimation 
window of 2003-2013. 
Our findings suggest that auditors charge unionized firms a significant fee premium, to 
compensate for incremental business risk. Auditors’ risk assessments reflect the higher 
complexity of unionized contexts and the disparities between the principals’ interests and 
                                                 
1 https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TUD (Accessed 26/06/2019). 
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employees’ claims. Hence, in the presence of unions, auditors devote additional time and 
undertake more thorough audit procedures which, in turn, affect billing rates. This fee premium 
is persistent after employing different measures of firm-level unionization and simultaneously 
controlling for additional internal monitoring devices, such as corporate governance and 
ownership structure. 
We also demonstrate that auditors consider political ideology supportive to labor unions 
as a parameter which increases corporate complexities. We provide evidence suggesting that 
auditors charge higher fees in states with no enactment of Right-to-Work legislation and in 
locales dominated by Democrats. Finally, we show that, in unionized contexts where 
employees participate in ownership, and conflicts between the principal’s interests and 
employees’ claims are to an extent alleviated, auditors reduce billing rates since they assess 
such contexts as less risky. Overall, our findings prove to be robust to alternative definitions of 
unionization, as well as to specification issues related to variable omission, endogeneity and 
selection bias.  
From a management perspective, comprehension of the fundamental relationship 
between unionization and monitoring costs is of utmost importance. This should direct 
managers towards placing considerable emphasis on (re)assessing and enhancing 
organizational control systems and improving governance policies in order to reduce business 
risk and the associated monitoring costs. Managers’ increased awareness is also imperative in 
organizational contexts where employees do not participate in ownership, as well as in 
geographical areas where political ideology supportive to labor unions prevails. 
There are concurrent studies to ours in the literature, which provide contradicting 
results. While Cheng, Mitra, and Song (2017) report a negative association between 
unionization and audit fees, Bryan (2017) and Fung, Lee, Srinidhi, and Su (2017) report a 
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positive association, similar to our study. The reasons for this discrepancy might be different 
estimation windows, empirical models, omitted variables and proxy operationalization of key 
variables. Our study significantly differs from previous works in a number of ways. First, we 
develop the richest empirical model, including variables related to corporate governance, 
ownership and demographics; variables which are not present in previous studies. In addition, 
we sensitivity-test for other variables and alternative definitions. Second, drawing upon 
Simunic (1980), we examine the resource-cost and the expected-loss components of audit fees 
by developing relevant models for auditor litigation risk and audit effort. For the first time, we 
demonstrate that the fee premium observed for unionized labor is due to audit complexity rather 
than to litigation costs. Finally, in an important deviation from previous studies, we examine 
how political ideology, legislation supportive to labor unions and employee share ownership 
may amplify or mitigate monitoring costs. 
We contribute to the existing literature on several fronts. First, we demonstrate that 
unionization inflates corporate contractual complexities and, thereby, increases monitoring 
costs. Hence, we support the complementary, rather than supplementary, role of unionization 
in relation to monitoring agents. Second, we draw attention to the impact of the political costs 
of labor unions on corporate contractual complexities, demonstrating that a dominant political 
ideology and legal environment supportive to labor increase monitoring costs in unionized 
firms. Finally, we further the understandings related to the role of employee share ownership 
by showing that employee participation in ownership operates as an alignment mechanism, 
which reduces the perceived conflict inherent to unionization and mitigates agency costs 
between labor and the principal. As a result, we stress that employee share ownership reduces 
monitoring costs in unionized corporations. 
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2 Hypotheses development 
2.1 Labor unionization and agency costs  
We employ agency theory to understand the relationship between unionization and 
agency cost due to the emphasis given to the “contractual nature” of firms (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Contractual arrangements between owners, management and employees are brought to 
the fore of the analysis (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 310). The degree of complexity of the 
aforementioned relationships tends to increase agency costs and, in particular, monitoring 
costs; i.e., procedures such as budget restrictions and strict operating rules, as well as 
monitoring mechanisms such as statutory audits intended to limit irregular activities (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). 
Contractual relations with labor are even more complex when employees are organized 
into unions (Chyz, et al., 2013). This is because, in order to advance employee claims to better 
wages, hours and working conditions, as well as to extract rents (i.e., wage premiums) for 
members, unions employ various tactics such as: collective bargaining; alternative “voice” 
mechanisms (e.g., participation in company boards and committees); lobbying; litigation; 
industrial action; and activism (Agrawal, 2012; Chen, et al., 2011b; Chyz, et al., 2013; Faleye, 
et al., 2006). 
Prior literature on financial economics has examined the conflict between union aims 
and principals’ and agents’ interests (Chyz, et al., 2013). Unions are primarily concerned with 
whether employers are in a position to generate enough cash flow to cover wages and benefits, 
and unions prefer long-term stability (Chen, Kacperczyk, & Ortiz-Molina, 2012; Faleye, et al., 
2006). Thus, labor unions develop risk-averse attitudes and influence managers towards 
adopting more conservative accounting policies (Hsieh, Jung, & Yi, 2017). Indeed, there is 
evidence suggesting that, “in the presence of unions, corporations spend less on new capital, 
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take fewer risks, grow more slowly and overall exhibit low total factor productivity” (Faleye, 
et al., 2006, p. 490); at the same time, they are characterized by less operating flexibility and a 
higher cost of capital (Chen, Kacperczyk, & Ortiz-Molina, 2011a; Chen, et al., 2012; Faleye, 
et al., 2006). 
Unlike unions, shareholders are residual claimants, while managers often have a 
significant proportion of their compensation tied to residual claims (e.g., stock options, stock 
appreciation rights, etc.) (Chyz, et al., 2013). Managers and shareholders are much riskier 
actors than labor unions and aim to make economically-optimal decisions, intended to increase 
shareholder value and decrease the cost of capital (Faleye, et al., 2006; Fung, et al., 2017). 
The antithesis2 between labor unions’ aims and principals’ and agents’ interests creates 
incentives for management to impair organized labor’s bargaining power (Bova, Dou, & Hope, 
2015; Cheng, 2017). Prior literature indicates that management may firstly resort to enhancing 
(or maintaining high levels of) information asymmetry, since disclosing information about the 
firm’s financial statements, forecast sales, and production costs and capital investments leads 
to significantly higher levels of wages and benefits for production employees (Kleiner & 
Bouillon, 1988). Cheng (2017) demonstrates that firms with strong unions withhold 
information from the public since reducing this asymmetry could hurt the firm. Managers are 
also highly likely to withhold good news (Chung, Lee, Lee, & Sohn, 2016) and miss analysts’ 
earnings estimates in order to signal a negative outlook to unions (Bova, 2013). 
Furthermore, in unionized firms, management may be more prone to: reporting larger 
losses (DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1991); adopting income-decreasing accounting methods for 
inventory valuation and asset depreciation (Matsa, 2010); immediately recognizing the 
                                                 
2 However, prior literature is inconclusive as to whether this antithesis results in a loss-loss situation for managers 
and shareholders or whether more complex valuation effects emerge, particularly under specific governance 
structures. 
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accumulated post-retirement benefit obligation (D'Souza, Jacob, & Ramesh, 2001); holding 
less cash than they would otherwise have held (Klasa, Maxwell, & Ortiz-Molina, 2009); and 
issuing more debt (Marciukaityte, 2015; Matsa, 2010). Managerial actions to weaken union 
bargaining power, through employing certain accounting methods and undertaking particular 
financial decisions, are highly likely to create financial reporting opacity which, in turn, 
increases the need for more detailed monitoring procedures. 
2.2 Labor unions and audit fees 
In light of the agency perspective, we consider audit pricing as an ideal proxy of 
monitoring costs for the following reasons. First, audit pricing constitutes an outcome of the 
auditors’ monitoring role after considering the proprietary evaluation of risks and complexities; 
this is accomplished by examining both information which is publicly available and inside 
information which is available only to the auditors through access to corporate files and regular 
discussions with corporate managers (Ghosh & Tang, 2015). Second, firm performance, which 
is highly correlated overall with agency costs, is not a major concern for auditors of the large 
audit firms, since these client firms tend to be profitable (Ghosh & Tang, 2015). Third, 
compared with other proxies of agency costs, audit pricing models are generally well specified 
and only vulnerable to limited concerns regarding econometric specifications. For example, 
their R-Squares are more than 70%, which indicates limited problems of correlated omitted 
variables (Causholli, et al., 2010). Additionally, reverse causality problems are highly unlikely 
since employees would not consider audit pricing elements over the election of a labor union 
at corporate level (Blanchflower, 2007). 
We draw upon Simunic (1980) who shows that audit fees consist of a resource cost 
component and an expected loss component. Prior studies have substantiated that the broader 
client context influences both the resource and expected loss components in the audit pricing 
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model (Jha & Chen, 2015). Accepting a client with a high business risk means that the auditor 
is highly likely to increase the amount of audit work (i.e., higher resource component) or the 
billing rate (i.e., higher expected loss component), or both (Brumfield, Elliott, & Jacobson, 
1983). Thus, audit fees are expected to increase because of the greater audit effort and/or 
because of assigning the job to the most experienced personnel on the engagement team (Bell, 
Landsman, & Shackelford, 2001). It is also likely that, in higher business-risk contexts, auditors 
may merely increase the billing rate in order to compensate for potential litigation costs in the 
future, without necessarily either increasing the effort made or specifying that experienced 
personnel perform the audit (Bell, et al., 2001). 
In assessing audit risk, auditors consider the complexity of the corporate context (Fung, 
et al., 2017). Auditing standards, guidelines and professional writings prescribe that an 
auditor’s engagement decision should be based upon a thorough assessment of the client, which 
is termed “engagement risk” (Bedard, Deis, Curtis, & Jenkins, 2008; Danziger, 1999; Ethridge, 
Marsh, & Revelt, 2007; Kerr, Grupe, Jooste, & Vreeland, 2007; Thomas, 1992; see also SAS 
No. 109, AU Sect. 314: Understanding the Entity and Its Environment).3 An essential 
component of engagement risk is the client’s business risk which, inter alia, comprises an 
assessment of the contractual complexities. Thus, we expect that the presence of labor unions 
is perceived by auditors as a parameter which increases the complexity of corporate contractual 
relationships and, therefore, inflates the audit risk factor for reasons concerning negative 
signaling, financial reporting opacity, and risk/exposure to litigation; these reasons may, in 
turn, have a great impact on corporate reputation, adverse publicity and potential regulatory 
sanctions (Ghosh & Tang, 2015).  
                                                 
3 https://www.aicpa.org/Research/Standards/AuditAttest/DownloadableDocuments/AU-00314.pdf (Accessed 
26/06/2019). 
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It is therefore expected that, in unionized contexts, a re-planning of the nature, timing 
and extent of audit procedures takes place (Bell, et al., 2001). Hence, auditors need to devote 
additional time and undertake more thorough audit procedures, since a higher resource 
component is associated with unionized firms. Additionally, or alternatively, audit firms may 
select more experienced auditors and individuals with increased capabilities and skills in order 
to deal with the complexities associated with the presence of unions. This also entails higher 
salary rates and, thereby, higher audit-pricing levels. Finally, a higher loss component may be 
expected since auditors are highly likely to increase the billing rate to compensate for potential 
litigation processes that may be instigated by unions. Indeed, empirical evidence from Bryan 
(2017) and Fung, et al. (2017) demonstrates that the association between unionization and audit 
fees is positive. 
However, we cannot rule out the possibility that a negative association is also likely. 
Cheng, et al. (2017) argue that unionized firms have fewer incentive to demand high-quality 
audits in order to preserve information asymmetry and bargain advantages over labor unions. 
In addition, auditors have fewer incentives to provide high-quality audit efforts since unionized 
firms engage in conservative rather than aggressive accounting choices. The authors support 
this rationale empirically by reporting a significantly negative association between 
unionization and audit fees (Cheng, et al. (2017). 
Against this background, and due to conflicting empirical evidence, our hypothesis is 
stated as follows: 
H: Ceteris paribus, labor unionization is associated with the level of audit fees  
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3 Research design 
3.1 Data 
Similar to other studies on audit fees, we commence in the post Sarbanes-Oxley era, since 
cleaner datasets are available from that point onwards (Francis & Yu, 2009), and we finish in 
the last available year when this study was initiated. We start with the entire gamut of U.S. 
publicly-listed firms in the Audit Analytics database; we then cross-check these firms to ensure 
there are data available across Compustat and Thomson Reuters Eikon databases from which 
we obtain, respectively, accounting and ownership structure data for the period 2003-2013. 
From this sample of 6,043 firms, we determine each firm’s historical business address as 
extracted from its filings (as previous studies, e.g., Marciukaityte, 2015). We then exclude 603 
firms with headquarters in foreign countries or outlying U.S. territories (e.g., Puerto Rico, the 
Virgin Islands, and Guam) (Cheng, et al., 2017).4 Our data requirements for control, ownership 
structure, corporate governance variables and unionization proxy estimation at industry-level 
(see in Hilary, 2006) necessitate a further removal of 4,674 firms due to missing data. Similarly 
to other studies (e.g., Hanlon, Krishnan, & Mills, 2012), we exclude financial institutions (two-
digit SIC codes 60-69) and utilities (two-digit SIC code 49), thus eliminating 85 firms because 
of their different regulatory rules. Next, we exclude another 157 firms since union-recognition 
data were unavailable through company filings. We remove these 157 firms from our sample 
in order to avoid companies which are arbitrarily defined as non-unionized. All observations 
remaining in the final sample correspond to firms clearly disclosing the existence or absence 
of a union representing employees in their 10-K filings. We further remove 8 firms audited by 
non-BIG4 audit firms, similar to Bryan (2017), as they represent less than 1.7% of the extracted 
                                                 
4 We obtain each firm’s historical business address through each company's filings, as databases tend to backfill 
business addresses (Marciukaityte, 2015). First, we download company filings, as available through the Securities 
Exchange Commission FTP server employed by Audit Analytics for the extraction of audit fee data. Next, we 
develop a PERL script that parses state code, state name, city, and zip code. 
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sample and their removal further improves our sample homogeneity (see Behn, Choi, & Kang, 
2008). Thus, we are left with a final sample comprising 516 companies, or 2,910 firm-years. 
The stages of sample selection are reported in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
3.2 Measuring labor unionization 
We operationalize a firm-level unionization measure to indicate the existence of 
organized labor (Agrawal, 2012; Cheng, 2017), though we also conduct further sensitivity tests 
for alternative definitions (see section 6.1). We focus on firm-level due to the lower 
measurement error (similar to Cheng, 2017; Cheng, et al., 2017).5 We determine whether 
company employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement by drawing upon Item 
1 (Business) of 10-K company filings. We download the company filings (available from the 
Securities Exchange Commission FTP server) and develop a PERL Script, similar to Cheng 
(2017), to parse sentences relating to union coverage. Similar to Cheng (2017), we employ 
keyword combinations such as: bargaining agreement(s); bargaining unit(s); collective 
agreement(s); collective bargain(ing); labo(u)r agreement(s); labo(u)r organization(s); labo(u)r 
union(s); organized labo(u)r; organiz(s)ed employee(s)/staff/personnel/workforce; work 
council(s); trade union(s); trade-union(s); union(s) activity(ies); union(s) agreement(s); union 
contract(s); union organization(s); unioniz(s)ed and union(s). Having parsed sentences related 
to union coverage, we manually verify and identify 1,755 observations of companies disclosing 
union representation (D_UNION), which serve as the treatment group, and 1,155 observations 
                                                 
5 Industry-level data rely on data available from the Union Membership and Coverage Database (UMCD), which 
is compiled from the Current Population Survey (CPS). This is a monthly household survey which suffers from 
some limitations: a) a uniform unionization pattern across companies in the same industry is assumed. However, 
recent evidence suggests great variations within an industry regarding unionization rates, implying that a non-
uniform pattern exists among companies within the same industry (Cheng, 2017). b) CPS data include both public- 
and private-sector unionization rates. So there is inherent noise in the calculations of public-sector unionization. 
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of companies that report no union representation, which act as a control group. Apart from the 
unionization indicator, we trace 2,402 instances where the exact percentage of unionized 
employees (PCT_UNION) is available. However, we only include this variable as an 
alternative proxy for unionization (see section 6.1), due to missing observations. 
To align our findings with prior literature and additionally examine whether 
measurement errors between firm-level and industry-level data provide serious impediments 
to empirical findings, we estimate two unionization proxies employing industry-level data. For 
these data, we draw upon the Union Membership and Coverage Database (UMCD). Similar to 
prior studies, we estimate our first proxy (UNION_IND) by multiplying the percentage of 
employees covered by collective bargaining in a firm’s primary Census Industry Classification 
(CIC) industry with the number of company employees over lagged total assets (see for 
example Bryan, 2017; Chen, et al., 2011a, 2012; Chyz, et al., 2013; Hilary, 2006). Since UMCD 
data are available in CIC codes, we use a crosswalk list retrieved through the U.S. Census 
Bureau, and convert CIC to Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes6. We estimate our 
second proxy (D_UNION_IND) as a dummy taking the value 1 if a company has union rates 
higher than the two-digit SIC and year median, and 0 otherwise (Chyz, et al., 2013). 
3.3 Empirical models 
We develop the model for the impact of labor unionization on audit pricing in section 
3.3.1. We further investigate this outcome by designing models to ascertain the association 
between labor unionization and litigation risk (3.3.2), and unionization and audit reporting lag 
(3.3.3). In all models we regard reverse causality as unlikely, i.e., levels of audit fees, audit lag 
or lawsuits do not determine the election of a labor union at corporate level. However, we 
                                                 
6 https://www.census.gov/people/io/methodology/ (Accessed 26/06/2019). 
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carefully consider issues related to omitted variables (6.2), selection bias (6.3) and endogeneity 
(6.4) in the sensitivity testing section. 
3.3.1 Audit fees and labor unions 
Drawing upon Simunic (1980) and the extant prior literature on audit pricing 
(Causholli, et al., 2010), we estimate our main model whilst considering client, auditor and 
engagement characteristics (Hay, Knechel, & Wong, 2006). We additionally control for 
geography and demographics. We measure audit fees by the natural logarithm (e.g., Hay, et al., 
2006). Considering that audit fees are sticky over time, we cluster standard errors at a firm 
level for this and all subsequent models (Srinidhi, Shaohua, & Firth, 2014). The functional 
form of the model is specified as follows: 
LAF = β0 + β1Union + β2LTA + β3FOREIGN + β4OPSEG + β5GEOSEG
+ β6MERGER + β7MB + β8AGE + β9LIT + β10ARIN_TA
+ β11GROWTH + β12LOSS + β13ROA + β14LEV + β15CR
+ β16GINDEX + β17CONC_OWN + β17LEAD_SIC + β19AUD_CH
+ β20COMP_AF + β21AUD_LAG + β22DEC + β23D_RES + β24SOC_CAP
+ β25DIST_SEC + β26POP + β27LITERACY + �YEAR
+ � INDUSTRY + ε 
(1) 
The vector Union represents the union-related variables employed to capture the impact 
of unionization on audit fees. We include firm-level (D_UNION) and industry-level 
unionization proxies (UNION_IND and D_UNION_IND) as discussed in section 3.2. Given 
that there are analytical explanations of control variables available in the relevant literature 
(Causholli, et al., 2010; Hay, et al., 2006), we only provide a brief account of their importance 
here in relation to audit fee levels and operationalization. 
15 
Client attributes refer to size, complexity, inherent risk, profitability, leverage, 
governance and ownership form. LTA captures firm size. We control for complexity through 
MERGER, FOREIGN, OPSEG, GEOSEG and MB (Fung, et al., 2017; Hay, et al., 2006). 
MERGER and FOREIGN are dummy variables signifying merger or acquisition and foreign 
operations respectively (Cheng, et al., 2017). OPSEG and GEOSEG represent the number of 
operating and geographic segments respectively, both expressed as natural logarithms, and 
demonstrate the operational and geographical dispersion of the client (Causholli, et al., 2010). 
We control for inherent risk by considering LIT, ARIN_TA, GROWTH and AGE. The 
dichotomous LIT indicates the existence/non-existence of a legal proceeding involving the 
client in the current year (Leventis, Dedoulis, & Abdelsalam, 2018). Dechow, Ge, Larson, and 
Sloan (2011) classify account receivables and inventory among the accounts most frequently 
associated with earnings management, and thus the ratio of accounts receivables and inventory 
over total assets (ARIN_TA) is included in our analysis. High-growth firms have a greater 
demand for audit services compared to low-growth firms (Choi & Wong, 2007) and they are 
often considered to be high risk by auditors (Hay, et al., 2006). Thus, we account for the 
percentage change in firm sales from the previous year (GROWTH). We also include (AGE) 
measured by the natural logarithm of years the firm appears in Compustat. We do not form a 
strong expectation about the sign of the coefficient, since prior literature reports inconsistent 
evidence (Bryan, 2017; Hope & Langli, 2010). We further control for profitability and 
leverage. Thus, we include LOSS which indicates the existence of a negative net income in the 
previous year, and ROA which is the ratio of income before extraordinary items over total 
assets. We also consider the ratio of total debt over total assets (LEV) and the ratio of current 
assets over current liabilities (CR) (Bryan, 2017; Causholli, et al., 2010). 
We additionally control for ownership structure and corporate governance attributes, 
since prior literature suggests that they warrant consideration (Hay, et al., 2006). We include 
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the existence of shareholders with at least a 20% stake of total firm shares (CONC_OWN) as a 
monitoring device which impacts negatively on audit fees (Desender, Aguilera, Crespi, & 
GarcÍa-Cestona, 2013). We further focus on: the proportion of nonexecutive board members 
over the total board size (BODINDEP); the average number of other corporate affiliations held 
by board members (BODAFF); the number of board meetings held (BODMEET); audit 
committee expertise (AUDEXP) (Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2009); and CEO duality (DUAL) 
(Gul & Leung, 2004); since prior studies suggest they are all important determinants of audit 
fees (Srinidhi, et al., 2014). We follow Srinidhi, et al. (2014), and calculate the board’s 
governance (GINDEX) strength by aggregating BODINDEP, BODMEET, AUDEXP, BODAFF 
and subtracting DUAL.7 
We also control for auditor attributes. We include auditor specialization (LEAD_SIC) 
and we define specialists as the audit offices with the highest total revenues in an industry per 
year; industries are defined using the two-digit SIC (Reichelt & Wang, 2010). We further 
sensitivity-test the operationalization and cut-off points of this proxy (see section 6.2). In 
addition, we consider auditor switching, measured as auditor change compared to the previous 
year (AUD_CH). We also control for audit market competition (COMP_AF) (Jha & Chen, 
2015), calculated according to the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index; i.e., defined as 
the sum of the square fractions of the audit fees an auditor generates in a two-digit SIC-county 
combination. We additionally control for engagement attributes, considering: the time elapsed 
from the year-end until the signature date of the auditor (AUD_LAG); fiscal year-end in 
December (DEC); and the existence of a financial restatement (D_RES) (Bryan, 2017). 
                                                 
7 Similar to Srinidhi, et al. (2014), we standardize each continuous variable to fall within the range [0, 1]. We 
scale BODMEET and BODAFF using the maximum value in our sample. The only component of the index that 
differs from Srinidhi, et al. (2014) is AUDEXP; in the Srinidhi, et al. (2014) paper, AUDEXP represents the 
percentage of financial experts in the audit committee, whereas in this study we take the extreme values and 
measure AUDEXP in a binary fashion. 
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Finally, we control for the geographic and demographic attributes of client 
headquarters. To do so, we regard corporate headquarters as the main place of managerial 
decision making (Coval & Moskowitz, 2001). We echo recent studies and incorporate the 
social capital of firm headquarters (SOC_CAP) (Jha & Chen, 2015) and the distance from the 
nearest SEC office8 (DIST_SEC) (Kedia & Rajgopal, 2011). Measured at county level, we also 
include the population of firm headquarters (POP) (Hay, et al., 2006) and the percentage of 
adults who have completed four years of college or higher (LITERACY) (Jha & Chen, 2015) as 
factors influential to audit pricing. All definitions for this and subsequent models are presented 
in the Appendix. 
3.3.2 Auditor litigation risk and labor unions 
We investigate the litigation-based explanation of audit fees by building a model for 
auditor litigation risk, based upon prior literature (Ghosh & Tang, 2015; Kaplan & Williams, 
2013; Lys & Watts, 1994; Shu, 2000). We specify the following probit model: 
LIT_AUDITOR =  β0 + β1Union + β2GINDEX + β3CONC_OWN + β4LTA
+ β5KMJRDA + β6GROWTH + β7ZSCORE + β8OPCF
+ β9INVENTORY + β10REC_TA + β11LOSS + β12RET + β13RETVOL
+ β14AUD_LAG + β15UNQOP + β16STENURE + β17TECH
+ β18SOC_CAP + β19DIST_SEC + β20POP + β21LITERACY + �YEAR
+ � INDUSTRY + ε 
(2) 
                                                 
8 We obtain the latitude and longitude data for each firm’s headquarters using the U.S. Census Bureau’s Gazetteer 
city-state files (www.census.gov/geo). Next, we compute the distance between corporate headquarters (point a) 
and urban areas (point b) using the following formula: 𝑑𝑑(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏) = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎[𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑎𝑎1)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑎𝑎2)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑏𝑏1)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑏𝑏2) +
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑎𝑎1)𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑎𝑎2)𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑏𝑏1)𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑏𝑏2) + 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑎𝑎1)𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑏𝑏1) ]𝑎𝑎. Where: a1 and b1 are respectively the latitudes and 
longitudes of the two points (expressed in radians) and r denotes the radius of the earth (approximately 3,958 
statutory miles). 
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We approximate auditor litigation using the data available in the Audit Analytics 
litigation dataset. We additionally examine the records of Stanford Class Action Clearinghouse 
but fail to trace any additional lawsuits against auditors in our sample. We create a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the audit firm is named as defendant in a lawsuit and 0 otherwise 
(LIT_AUDITOR), thus measuring the direct exposure of an auditor to litigation risk (Ghosh & 
Tang, 2015). 
Next, we describe the control variables included in the audit risk model. We include: 
GINDEX and CONC_OWN, as previously described, since corporate governance and investor 
monitoring affect auditor’s exposure to litigation risk (Cassell, Drake, & Dyer, 2018); client 
size (LTA), since larger clients receive greater exposure to market scrutiny; cash flow from 
operations scaled by total assets (OPCF) as a performance measure (Kaplan & Williams, 
2013); abnormal accruals (KMJRDA) as a measure for earnings quality, based on the 
cross-sectional modified version of the Jones model and adjusted for performance (Kothari, 
Leone, & Wasley, 2005); corporate financial condition (ZSCORE), since managers' incentives 
to mislead increase when the firm is in financial distress (Lys & Watts, 1994); and GROWTH, 
since high-growth firms have greater difficulty in establishing and enforcing internal controls 
(Lys & Watts, 1994). As an auditor’s propensity to face a lawsuit increases with the levels of 
inventory and accounts receivable (Lys & Watts, 1994; Shu, 2000), we consider the ratio of 
inventory (INVENTORY) and accounts receivables (REC_TA) scaled by total assets. Since both 
loss reporting and unqualified opinion issuance increase the probability of lawsuits (Shu, 
2000), we include LOSS and UNQOP in our model. We also account for the following: audit 
effort (AUD_LAG); auditor-client relationship being less than three years (STENURE); firm’s 
stock returns over the fiscal year (RET), as a measurement of investor losses; and the variance 
of abnormal stock returns (RETVOL) (Kaplan & Williams, 2013). We additionally include the 
client’s membership of a high-tech industry (TECH) (Ghosh & Tang, 2015) and the geographic 
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and demographic characteristics of firm headquarters (as presented in section 3.3.1: POP, 
LITERACY, DIST_SEC and SOC_CAP). 
3.3.3 Audit report lag and labor unions 
Audit report lag can proxy for audit investment and complexities (Bamber, Bamber, & 
Schoderbek, 1993), and unions can affect audit report lag, as discussed in 2.2. Based on prior 
literature (Bamber, et al., 1993; Ghosh & Tang, 2015; Knechel & Payne, 2001), we specify the 
following model: 
AUD_LAG =  β0 + β1Union + β2GINDEX + β3CONC_OWN + β4LTA + β5KMJRDA
+ β6UNQOP + β7ROA + β8MB + β9LEV + β10AGE + β11FOREIGN
+ β12MERGER + β13AUD_CH + β14DEC + β15SOC_CAP + β16DIST_SEC
+ β17POP + β18LITERACY + �YEAR + � INDUSTRY + ε 
(3) 
We control internal firm-monitoring strength by including corporate governance 
(GINDEX) (Niemi, 2005) and concentrated ownership (CONC_OWN) (Leventis, Weetman, & 
Caramanis, 2005). Larger firms (LTA) not only have the incentives, but also the capability, to 
reduce audit lags through increased monitoring and advanced technologies (Knechel & Payne, 
2001). We consider KMJRDA in order to control for the influence of aggressive accounting 
(Blankley, Hurtt, & MacGregor, 2014). We also control for the following: unqualified audit 
opinion (UNQOP); profitability (ROA); risks associated with growth opportunities (MB) 
(Knechel & Sharma, 2012); financial condition (LEV); and corporate age (AGE) (Lee, Ingram, 
& Howard, 1999). Complexities which might delay the audit are included by considering 
FOREIGN, MERGER, DEC and AUD_CH. We conclude the model specification with the 
specific demographic characteristics of firm headquarters, i.e., POP, LITERACY, DIST_SEC 
and SOC_CAP. 
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4 Empirical results 
4.1 Univariate analysis 
We present the descriptive statistics of the entire sample, both unionized and non-
unionized companies, in Table 2. We also present a comparison of means and corresponding 
statistical significance between the unionized and non-unionized firms. The two groups differ 
in terms of size, growth, profitability, cash holdings, asset mix and leverage; however, they 
share similar characteristics for ownership structure, auditor and engagement attributes. These 
findings support prior literature, demonstrating that firms facing union bargaining positions 
strategically hold less cash (Klasa, et al., 2009), more inventory and more debt (Matsa, 2010), 
as well as having volatile cash flows (Chen, Liao, & Tsai, 2011c) and lower profitability (Lee 
& Mas, 2012). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to mitigate 
any effects from outliers. Unionized companies are found to be charged with higher audit fees 
compared to non-unionized companies, as the mean (median) values of LAF are 15.284 
(15.259) and 14.489 (14.473) respectively, with the difference being statistically significant at 
1%.9 The descriptive statistics of LAF are very similar to prior relevant studies (Bryan, 2017; 
Cheng, et al., 2017; Fung, et al., 2017). 
With respect to other control variables in the audit fee model, the mean (median) value 
of GINDEX is 1.549 (1.372), slightly greater than the values reported in Srinidhi, et al. (2014). 
The mean AGE of our sample companies is 3.191 (similar to Leventis, et al., 2018), while the 
mean values of CR, ROA, and LEV are 2.152, 0.059 and 0.242 respectively, indicating that our 
sample firms are not particularly liquid, profitable, or leveraged; these findings are similar to 
some prior studies (see Gul & Goodwin, 2010) but different to others (Cheng, et al., 2017). 
                                                 
9 We examined the audit-pricing pattern of unionized and non-unionized firms, per Big-4 audit firm. Untabulated 
results indicate that all Big-4 auditors charge unionized firms with higher audit fees, statistically significant at 1% 
(see Table S 3 of the online Supplementary Material). 
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Additionally, 66.6% of firms have a financial year end on 31 December (identical to Jha and 
Chen (2015) and smaller than the mean value reported in Bryan (2017) – i.e., 0.7); while 
approximately 34% are audited by industry specialists, which is similar to Cheng, et al. (2017). 
Interestingly, around 35% of our sample firms have been involved in a major litigation, which 
is lower than the value reported by Bryan (2017) and Fung, et al. (2017) for their industry-
based litigation measure. Finally, county-level control variables (SOC_CAP, POP and 
LITERACY) are similar to those reported in Jha and Chen (2015). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
We present a Pearson’s correlation matrix in Table 3, where almost all variables are 
correlated significantly with LAF, with LTA exhibiting the highest coefficient of 0.71. Labor 
unionization is significantly correlated with LAF at 1%, which remains strong and positive for 
all alternative operationalizations of labor unionization. OPSEG and GEOSEG are correlated 
at 0.66, and ROA and LOSS at -0.67 which is relatively high. We keep these variables in the 
main model for reasons of comparability with prior studies, while sensitivity testing our main 
inferences after their exclusion (see Table S 6 of the online Supplementary Material). We 
separately include each of these variables in our model and observe that the inferences for our 
main independent variable (D_UNION) remain unchanged. All other inferences make 
economic sense and suggest that multicollinearity is not a serious problem. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
4.2 Multivariate analysis 
4.2.1 Impact of unionization on audit fees 
The results of the audit fee model are presented in Table 4. All regression models are 
significant at 1%, with explanatory power of around 79%. The coefficient of D_UNION is 
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positive and statistically significant at 1% (column 1, β=0.164, t-stat=3.59), which supports the 
hypothesis. Thus, audit firms achieve audit premiums when auditing unionized firms. If a 
company becomes unionized it will pay an increase in audit fees of around 18% 
(e0.164=1.1782 - 1=0.1782), i.e., an average increase of $0.882mil10 per year per firm, which is 
economically material in absolute terms. UNION_IND is significant at 5% (column 3, β=8.981, 
t-stat=2.00), while D_UNION_IND is significant at 1% (column 2, β=0.127, t-stat=4.46). Thus, 
no matter how unionization is measured, our findings indicate that auditors charge unionized 
firms significantly more. The results also indicate that measurement errors related to industry-
level data are not material, and therefore do not lead to misleading results, which lends further 
credibility to evidence reported by prior literature. 
All coefficients across control variables have the predicted sign (apart from GINDEX 
and MB), with firm size (LTA) receiving the highest t-statistic. Overall, less-profitable and 
more-diversified firms, as well as firms operating with greater levels of inherent risk (LIT, 
ARIN_TA and GROWTH), pay more audit fees. Additionally, more complex audits (AUD_LAG 
and DEC) demand premiums. LIT has a significant and positive sign which suggests that 
litigation is an important element of the inherent risk that auditors consider when organizing 
and executing the audit (see Hay, et al., 2006). The negative coefficient of AUD_CH requires 
some further investigation to verify whether low-balling takes place (DeAngelo, 1981). 
LEAD_SIC is significant with a positive sign, suggesting that when audit firms dominate a 
market sector they achieve fee premiums (Francis, Reichelt, & Wang, 2005). Finally, a fee 
discount is detected when a firm is located away from the SEC radar, in areas with high social 
capital or with a less-educated population. In all models, the mean VIFs are less than 1.52, 
implying no multicollinearity. 
                                                 
10 Estimated as 18% * $4.905mil ($4.905mil is the average audit fee obtained from Table 2). 
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Overall, our results support prior literature and demonstrate that audit pricing is affected 
by client, auditor and audit-engagement characteristics. They also indicate a positive 
association between unionization and audit pricing and, thus, provide empirical support for the 
complementary role of organized labor as regards monitoring costs (Bryan, 2017; Fung, et al., 
2017). 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
4.2.2 Unionization and auditor litigation risk 
Litigation risk determines audit fees (Choi, Kim, Liu, & Simunic, 2009) and, thus, the 
higher fees detected for unionized firms might be due to the enhanced litigation risk associated 
with organized labor. Therefore, we examine whether the presence of unions entails a higher 
and direct litigation risk for auditors. Within our sample of 2,910 observations, we identify 20 
cases of lawsuits filed against auditors related to a client’s financial reporting matters (see Table 
5). An auditor may be subject to more than one lawsuit per case, as multiple parties file lawsuits 
against auditors. Following Ghosh and Tang (2015), we include one observation per 
client/auditor. Therefore, the likelihood of an auditor being sued is approximately 0.69% 
(=20/2,910). Of the 20 lawsuits, 14 relate to unionized companies while the remaining 6 
involve non-unionized companies, with the corresponding likelihoods being 0.80% 
(=14/1,755) and 0.52% (=6/1,155) respectively. Despite the difference in incidences of a 
lawsuit, the difference between the likelihood of the two groups is not statistically significant. 
 [Insert Table 5 about here] 
We further conduct a probit analysis using the LIT_AUDITOR as dependent variable 
(see Table 6). We present three columns where we gradually include year and industry-fixed 
effects. We do so to maintain the same number of observations as other pooled tests, since 
including year and industry-fixed effects results in a loss of observations for years and 
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industries that have no lawsuits filed. The pseudo R-Square is around 36%, which is high when 
compared to relevant studies (Ghosh & Tang, 2015). The coefficient of D_UNION is -0.168 
(see column 1 in Table 6) and non-significant (t-stat=-0.81). Thus, the findings suggest that fee 
premiums are not due to a higher litigation risk. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
With respect to the other coefficients, GINDEX and CONC_OWN exhibit positive and 
significant coefficients, indicating that an auditor’s probability of facing a lawsuit increases 
with the existence of stronger governance and concentrated ownership within the client firm. 
These findings are in line with prior studies, as larger clients with longer report lags (Kaplan 
& Williams, 2013) and higher levels of accounts receivables (Lys & Watts, 1994; Shu, 2000) 
are associated with an increased probability of auditor lawsuits. In addition, financially-
healthier companies (ZSCORE) located in areas with higher social capital are associated with 
a lower probability of auditor lawsuits (Jha & Chen, 2015). 
4.2.3 Unionization and audit report lag 
We examine whether auditors consider labor unionization as a complexity in audit 
engagements. This could require additional audit effort which would explain higher audit fees. 
We proxy audit effort with AUD_LAG. The results reported in Table 7 indicate that D_UNION 
is 1.959 and significant at 1% (t-stat=2.75).11 The adjusted R-Square is 20.7, similar to prior 
studies (Leventis, et al., 2005). Regarding the remaining coefficients in the model, larger, more 
profitable and financially-healthier companies seem to require less effort from the auditor, 
which is similar to prior studies (Leventis, et al., 2005). 
                                                 
11 Our inferences remain unchanged when we use the natural logarithm of audit report lag as the dependent 
variable, since the coefficient of D_UNION remains positive and statistically significant at 1%. 
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[Insert Table 7 here] 
We conclude that the fee premium observed for organized labor is due to audit 
complexity rather than to litigation costs. 
5 Extensions 
We extend our investigation by testing whether the prevailing political ideology 
inherent to labor unions’ power and outcomes plays any role in audit pricing. First, we examine 
whether the impact of unions on audit fees is dissimilar between states which enact Right-to-
Work legislation (RTW) and those which do not, since evidence suggests that such laws 
decrease union organizing and power (Cheng, 2017; Marciukaityte, 2015; Matsa, 2010). 
Second, we investigate whether the impact of unions is different in locales dominated by the 
Democratic Party, as the literature associates Democrats with increased union power (Chen, et 
al., 2011a; Marciukaityte, 2015). Finally, we test whether employee share ownership, 
suggested as a mechanism that aligns the interests of employees to those of principals (Richter 
& Schrader, 2017) and weakens employee commitment to trade unionism (Poole & Jenkins, 
1990), impacts on audit pricing. 
5.1 Labor unions and Right-to-Work laws 
RTW laws grant unionized employees the right to opt out of union membership (see 
Ellwood & Fine, 1987; Holmes, 1998). There is convincing evidence which demonstrates that 
RTW laws are associated with loss of union power, since this legislation constrains unions' 
financial resources, reduces their organizing activity and ultimately impairs their effectiveness 
and strength (Ellwood & Fine, 1987; Matsa, 2010). Thus, we consider states which enact RTW 
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legislation as less union-friendly. Our investigation echoes the current hot debate over RTW 
laws due to recent changes in the U.S. political landscape.12 
We test whether unionized companies located in states without RTW laws exhibit 
higher audit fees due to increased union power. We divide our sample into two groups (see 
Table 8), based on the effective year of RTW laws at state level, available through the National 
Right to Work Committee. We observe that the coefficient of D_UNION is statistically 
significant at 1% (column 2, β=0.151, t-stat=2.74) for states without RTW laws and significant 
at 10% (column 1, β=0.144, t-stat=1.65) for those states with, supporting the notion that 
unionized companies face audit fee premiums in states with higher union power. We also test 
for homogeneity in the pairwise estimated coefficients (using a Wald test, column 3 in Table 
8) and the difference in coefficients of D_UNION is statistically significant at 1% across RTW 
and non-RTW states. Thus, we demonstrate that auditors achieve higher fees in non-RTW 
states. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
5.2 Labor unions and the Democratic Party 
Since Franklin Roosevelt, the Democrat party has traditionally been considered 
supportive to labor, mainly by supporting labor-friendly legislation and policies. As recently 
as 2008, unions were responsible for $75 million in political donations, with 92% going to the 
Democrats (McGinty & Mullins, 2012). In 2009, the Democrats introduced the Employee Free 
                                                 
12 According to the National Right to Work Committee, four states have voted for RTW laws since 2012. These 
are: Indiana (February 01, 2012), Michigan (March 08, 2013), Wisconsin (March 09, 2015), and West Virginia 
(February 12, 2016). Unions campaigned to make RTW laws unconstitutional (Shikha, 2012); in fact, as of June 
2016, 11 unions had filed lawsuits against the passage of RTW legislation in West Virginia (Kabler, 2016). 
Interestingly, Josh Sword, secretary treasurer of the West Virginia AFLCIO, stated: “First and foremost, it’s 
unconstitutional because it’s an illegal taking of property without due process”. The principal argument behind 
the criticism that this legislation is unconstitutional lies in the Fifth Amendment’s provision that private property 
cannot be taken for public use unless compensation is paid. 
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Choice Act (EFCA), which favors labor unions, to both houses of the Congress.13 
Strengthening workers’ rights still remains a hot topic on the Democrat agenda, as Bernie 
Sanders, a candidate for the leadership of the Democratic Party in 2016, introduced the 
Workplace Democracy Action legislation to the U.S. Senate in 2015 
(http://www.sanders.senate.gov). In contrast, Republicans tend to be against labor 
unionization. Indicatively, in a case that attracted massive media attention, Republican 
politicians and conservative lobby groups organized a very successful public campaign against 
unionization at Volkswagen in Chattanooga, Tennessee (Mueller & Stegmaier, 2017). 
Therefore, unions tend to have increased power in states/counties influenced by Democrats 
(Marciukaityte, 2015). Apart from legislation, politicians can directly influence labor issues 
since Congress confirms the board members to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), 
which is responsible for the investigation of unfair labor practices. 
To test our prediction, we obtain data on the outcome of presidential elections at both 
state and county levels, and divide our sample into states/counties where Democrats 
(Republicans) won the most votes in the presidential elections of 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 
(http://uselectionatlas.org/). The results of the multivariate analyses are presented in Table 9, 
as well as the homogeneity in the pairwise estimated coefficients across models (using a Wald 
test, columns 3 and 6). The coefficient of D_UNION is statistically significant at 1% across 
samples for Democrats winning the most presidential votes at either state (column 1, β=0.186, 
t-stat=3.55) or county level (column 4, β=0.154, t-stat=3.07). In contrast, the coefficients of 
D_UNION are statistically insignificant in states where Republicans won, though significant at 
10% in counties where Republicans won. Our results indicate that unionized companies are 
                                                 
13 The EFCA would provide employees with the right to sign “union authorization cards” instead of voting for or 
against union representation in a secret ballot. According to the The National Right to Work Committee (2009), 
the passage of the EFCA would give union officials the upper hand and, in turn, impair their incentives to ensure 
a speedy and mutually-beneficial contract. However, the Democrats could not get enough votes together to defeat 
a Republican filibuster. 
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charged with higher fees in states/counties with greater union power. Testing for homogeneity 
in the pairwise estimated coefficients, we observe that the difference in coefficients of 
D_UNION is statistically significant at 1% across the subsamples of dominance by Democrats 
versus Republicans, at both state and county levels. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
5.3 Employee share ownership 
Employee participation in ownership is expected to bring an interest alignment between 
employees and other shareholders and a consequent reduction in information asymmetries, as 
well as bargaining and conflict costs (Richter & Schrader, 2017), and is expected to weaken 
employee commitment to trade unionism (Poole & Jenkins, 1990). Thus, auditors’ risk 
assessments are expected to reflect the lower complexity and, consequently, reduced risk 
related to corporate structures where employees possess an ownership stake. 
We derive information on employee share ownership from Form 5500 files which 
represent the annual report of employee benefit plans, available through the Department of 
Labor’s (DoL) research files (https://www.dol.gov/ebsa). We aggregate the market value of the 
equity holdings of each firm in a given year with at least one of the following employee 
ownership vehicles: employee stock ownership plans (ESOP); 401(k) plans that allow an 
investment in employer stock as an option; deferred profit-sharing plans in which part of the 
profit-sharing contribution is invested in employer stock; and employer-stock bonus plans 
(Bova, et al., 2015). We measure non-executive employee share ownership (ESO) as the 
aforementioned aggregated equity holdings over total shares outstanding for the firm in a given 
year, similar to other studies (Richter & Schrader, 2017). 
The results for the impact of ESO on audit fees are reported in Table 10, separated into 
unionized firms and non-unionized firms (columns 1 and 2 respectively), and the full sample 
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(see columns 3 and 4). Regression models are significant with explanatory powers close to 
80%. The coefficient of ESO is negative and statistically significant at 5% (column 1, β=-0.331, 
t-stat=-2.11), indicating a fee discount for unionized firms with employee ownership. However, 
this result is not evident for non-unionized firms, as the coefficient of ESO lacks statistical 
significance (see column 2). We further consider the full sample and we find that the coefficient 
of ESO is negative and significant at 5% (column 3, β=-0.305, t-stat=-2.13). This holds when 
controlling for D_UNION (column 4), which interestingly drops to a significance level of 5%. 
The remaining coefficients have the predicted sign, while in all models the mean VIFs are less 
than 1.56, implying no multicollinearity. Overall, the results indicate that employee ownership 
mitigates monitoring costs, on the basis of a closer alignment of employee and shareholder 
interests, and that the power of unionism on audit pricing is mitigated. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
6 Sensitivity testing 
We conduct sensitivity tests for alternative definitions of unionization and verify that 
the audit fee premium is persistent (6.1). We further account for specification issues related to 
variable omission (6.2). Finally, we test our inferences by employing propensity score matched 
and entropy balance matching approaches to mitigate concerns that our results could be prone 
to selection bias (6.3); while we alleviate endogeneity concerns by adopting the Heckman 
(1979) two-stage procedure and instrumental variables (IV) approaches (6.4). 
6.1 Alternative definition of unionization 
We measure unionization based on the percentage of unionized employees 
(PCT_UNION) as derived from company filings which, however, is underreported when 
compared to the existence of organized labor (D_UNION). We additionally include the 
existence of a union-related risk indication in the company filings (UNION_RISK). This 
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variable is available for the years 2005 onwards, due to a SEC mandate to disclose Item 1A 
Risk Factors.14 Thus, we sensitivity test both variables rather than consider them as our main 
measures of unionization for reasons related to a material drop in observations. We further 
follow Cheng (2017) and estimate a comprehensive measure of the overall influence of 
organized labor (CB), calculated as the first principal component of the percentage of unionized 
employees (PCT_UNION), the coverage dummy (D_UNION), and the union-related risk 
dummy (UNION_RISK). Running the models again, the magnitude of all coefficients of 
alternative unionization proxies is positive, with CB and UNION_RISK being statistically 
significant at 1% and PCT_UNION being statistically significant at 10% (results presented in 
Table S 5 of the online Supplementary Material). 
6.2 Variable omission 
We test for sensitivity with a battery of variables that have been found or suggested 
(explicitly or implicitly) to influence audit pricing but are not included in our full model due to 
data and/or specification reasons. We test the natural logarithm of non-audit fees (NAF) and 
the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees (FEE) (Cheng, et al., 2017). NAF is significant with a 
positive sign, while FEE is significant with a negative sign. We also control for membership 
of the Fortune 500 index (D_FORRK) (Kedia & Rajgopal, 2011), and research and 
development to turnover (RD) (Gul & Goodwin, 2010); with the former being positive and 
significant at 10% and the latter negative and insignificant. The incorporation of all the above 
variables (tabulated in Table S 7 of the online Supplementary Material) does not change our 
inferences. 
                                                 
14 Similar to Cheng (2017), we parse union-related risk expressions included in Item 1A (Risk Factors), as firms 
report idiosyncratic factors (e.g., labor relations, labor union activity) under this item. UNION_RISK is set to 1 if 
the company discloses risks related to: 1) union presence, 2) union organizing activity, 3) expiry of bargaining 
agreements (either in current or next year), 4) work stoppages or 5) negative impact on firm performance and/or 
profitability, and 0 otherwise. We identify 728 instances of union-related risk. 
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We control for the auditor’s assessment of internal controls efficiency (Gul & Goodwin, 
2010) and use a dummy, obtained from Audit Analytics, indicating efficient/inefficient internal 
controls (ICE). We find that the inefficiency of internal controls significantly increases audit 
fees (at the 1% significance level), probably due to the increased audit risk and/or because 
auditors undertake some extra relevant tasks; while the coefficient of D_UNION remains 
significant at 1%. We further control for increased complexity in reporting (DISC), using an 
indicator equal to 1 when a firm reports discontinued operations and extraordinary items, and 
0 otherwise (Ghosh & Tang, 2015). Again, the coefficient of DISC is positive and significant 
at the 1% level, while D_UNION remains significant at 1% (reported in Table S 7 of the online 
Supplementary Material). 
We also test for additional demographic and geographic controls (results can be found 
in Table S 8 of the online Supplementary Material). We account for religiosity (REL), 
conceptualized as the degree of adherence to religious norms in the geographical area where a 
firm’s headquarters is located (Leventis, et al., 2018), as this is found to be negatively 
associated with audit fees in the U.S. Influenced by recent studies, we control for state judicial 
quality, since the quality and integrity of the judicial system may influence managerial and 
auditor decisions (Kedia & Rajgopal, 2011). We operationalize state judicial quality 
(JUD_QUAL) using the overall state ranking reported in the 2001 State Liabilities Rankings 
Study, which was conducted for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (2002) (see 
http://www.uschamber.com). Neither coefficient of the aforementioned variables is 
statistically significant, while our inferences remain unchanged. 
We control for whether the states where corporate headquarters are located have 
implemented the education requirement of the 150-hour rule (D_EDU150), since it has been 
suggested to influence audit price determination (Allen & Woodland, 2010). Indeed, 
D_EDU150 is positive and significant at the 1% level, while D_UNION remains significant at 
32 
1%. Drawing upon the Division of Labor Force Statistics (2014), the propensity to become 
unionized is a function of gender, race and age. Accordingly, black male workers between the 
ages of 45 and 65 are more unionized when compared to white female workers of younger 
ages. We control, at the county level, for: the percentage of the population who are black 
(BLACK); the percentage of the population who are men (MALE); and the percentage of the 
population between the ages of 45 and 64 (POP45_64). Again, our inferences remain 
unchanged. 
Prior studies associate a company’s location with audit fee premiums (discount) if 
located in an urban (rural) area (Clatworthy & Peel, 2007). We regard corporate headquarters 
as the main place of managerial decision making (see also Coval & Moskowitz, 2001) and 
create indicator variables for headquarters located in urban or urban agglomerate areas (URB) 
and rural areas (RUR). Following Francis, Hasan, John, and Waisman (2016), we 
operationalize URB as a corporate location within one of the ten largest Consolidated 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSA) of the United States (http://www.uschamber.com),15 or 
in one of the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) with at least 1 million residents. We 
operationalize RUR as a corporate location at least 250 miles away from the nearest urban area 
(Duranton & Puga, 2004; Francis, et al., 2016).16 D_UNION remains significant at 1%, while 
the coefficients PUR and URB lack statistical significance. 
As additional robustness checks, we include the quadratic transformation of firm size 
(SQTA), to account for potential non-linearities of audit fees (Cullinan, Du, & Zheng, 2016). 
                                                 
15 We consider as CMSAs the following: New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Philadelphia, 
Washington, Miami, Atlanta, and Boston. 
16 We classify as “urban” any Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), as defined by the U.S. Census, with at least 1 
million residents. Previous literature on urban economics provides ample evidence that the distance to urban 
centers significantly differentiates corporations (Duranton & Puga, 2004) and that the 250 miles criterion is a valid 
measure of this differentiation in the U.S. (Francis, et al., 2016). Distances are calculated using the methodology 
described in footnote 6. 
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We then repeat our analyses after excluding firm-years with an auditor change, to rule out 
competing arguments including audit fee discounting in the first year of engagement (Ghosh 
& Lustgarten, 2006). None of these tests alters our inferences (as indicated in Table S 9 of the 
online Supplementary Material). 
Following Srinidhi, et al. (2014), we substitute GINDEX in the model with all the 
components of this index individually, as well as creating a variable representing the first 
principal components (GOV_PCA) instead of the index form. We change the cut-off point for 
concentrated ownership to 25% (CONC_OWN_25) (Desender, et al., 2013) and further 
distinguish between domestic-concentrated (DOM_CONC_OWN) and foreign-concentrated 
(FOR_CONC_OWN) ownership types, based on the shareholder’s country of 
origin/headquarters. Our results indicate that concentrated ownership (CONC_OWN_25) and 
domestic-concentrated ownership (DOM_CONC_OWN_25) are both statistically significant 
and negatively associated with audit fees, while the coefficient D_UNION remains significant 
at 1% (tabulated in Table S 10 of the online Supplementary Material). 
Finally, similar to prior studies (Reichelt & Wang, 2010), while we define auditor 
expertise as the audit firm with the largest audit fee market share in a two-digit SIC industry, 
we also sensitivity test for alternative definitions. Thus, we run the models again and include 
specialization defined as when an audit firm has a fee market share of at least 25% (30%) in a 
two-digit SIC industry (e.g., Numan & Willekens, 2012). We augment our testing by creating 
indicators for city-level specialization, based on an audit office having the largest audit fee 
market share in a combination of two-digit SIC industry and MSA (LEAD_MSA) (Reichelt & 
Wang, 2010), or in a two-digit SIC industry and county combination (LEAD_CNT). All 
measures of auditor specialization are highly significant and positively associated with audit 
fees, whilst the coefficient of D_UNION remains unchanged (as reported in Table S 11 of the 
online Supplementary Material). 
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6.3 Statistical matching techniques 
In line with relevant studies (Bryan, 2017; Chapman, Miller, & White, 2019; Cheng, et 
al., 2017) and to ensure that the results are robust to alternative matching methodologies, we 
implement propensity-score (PSM) and entropy-balancing matching (EBM) techniques. In 
both techniques we use the same set of observable firm characteristics (covariates). Following 
Cheng (2017), we employ the following covariates: LTA; MB; TANGIBILITY of the firm 
expressed as net PPE scaled by total assets; LEV; ZSCORE; ROA; the natural logarithm of 
market capitalization (MKVAL); and the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
(ABS_KMJRDA) (Kothari, et al., 2005). We additionally include: total cash and investment 
securities deflated by total assets (CASH); inventories to total assets (INVENTORY), since 
unionized firms strategically adjust reserves (Klasa, et al., 2009) and inventory levels (Matsa, 
2010); and AGE, as union density is higher in older firms (Hirsch, 2004). Finally, we account 
for MALE, BLACK and POP45_64, all at a county level, as described in section 6.2. 
First, we employ PSM as it is capable of moderating the differences between the 
treatment (unionized) and control (non-unionized) groups (Shipman, Swanquist, & Whited, 
2017). Initially, we run a probit model to predict the probability that the firm is unionized 
(propensity score), conditional on the aforementioned covariates. Next, we employ a nearest-
neighbor matching approach without replacement and with a caliper constraint (δ=0.1) 
(Shipman, et al., 2017). We then match firms that are unionized and non-unionized, based on 
closeness to the predicted value from the first step and with the restriction of matching pairs 
belonging to the same year and two-digit SIC industry. This process yields 275 matching pairs. 
Second, we implement the EBM technique due to its ability to correct distribution biases 
between the treatment and control groups, via achieving equality between the post-weighting 
means and variances of the two groups (Chapman, et al., 2019). Another advantage of the EBM 
is that it enables us to preserve the same sample size as in baseline regressions. In untabulated 
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results, we perform our analysis on the samples subsequent to PSM and EBM matching (see 
Tables S 14 and S 16, respectively, in the online Supplementary Material). We observe that the 
coefficient of D_UNION remains positive and statistically significant at 1%. 
6.4 Mitigating endogeneity concerns 
In order to mitigate concerns regarding the potential endogeneity of unionization and 
of unions’ self-selection in relation to organizing in firms, we adopt the Heckman (1979) two-
stage procedure and employ an instrumental variables (IV) approach. In line with previous 
studies (e.g., Chen, et al., 2012), we instrument D_UNION with the fraction of female workers 
in a firm’s CIC industry (in logarithmic form – FEMALE).17 On the one hand, we anticipate a 
negative relationship with FEMALE since women’s propensity to join unions is lower and, 
thus, industries with a high concentration of female employees tend to be less unionized 
(Hirsch, 1980). On the other hand, there is no obvious reason why FEMALE would directly 
affect audit pricing. In untabulated results, we observe that the coefficient of D_UNION 
remains positive and statistically significant at 1% across both estimation methods (see Table 
S 17 of the online Supplementary Material), while the coefficient of FEMALE attains a 
significant negative coefficient (at 1%). This indicates that it is a strong instrument, as the 
inverse Mills ratio is significant and the F-statistic lies above the threshold of 10 (Staiger & 
Stock, 1997). 
7 Discussion 
In this study, we examine the effects of unionization on monitoring costs, which 
constitute important elements of corporate operations and firm value. By doing so, we aim to 
                                                 
17 The NBER CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups File data are available in Census Industry Classification 
(CIC) codes and provide estimates on a yearly basis (http://www.nber.org/morg/annual/). We follow the 
methodology described in Section 3.2 and transform each firm’s primary CIC into Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes. 
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fill a significant gap in management literature. Though the literature has provided rich insights 
into the impact of unions on core corporate matters (including efficiency, productivity, 
performance, risk and strategic decision-making), there is limited and contradicting evidence 
on the relationship between unionization and monitoring costs. 
We extend the investigation into the conflicting nature of union aims and the interests 
of principals and agents. Unions are described as primarily concerned with promoting claims 
to better wages, hours and working conditions. However, such pressures contradict shareholder 
and manager interests, which are aimed at increasing shareholder value and reducing the cost 
of capital. We argue that this structural antithesis increases the complexities of contractual 
relations and information asymmetry and makes unionized contexts financially more opaque. 
We empirically demonstrate that monitoring costs significantly increase due to unionized 
contexts being more risky and, therefore, additional time and effort is devoted to monitoring 
purposes. Thus, we support Bryan (2017) and Fung, et al. (2017) on the complementary role 
of unionization as regards monitoring costs, contrary to Cheng, et al. (2017). 
We also show that monitoring costs are significantly higher in states with no enactment 
of RTW legislation and in locales dominated by Democrats. Legislation and dominant political 
ideologies supportive to unionization are considered to be factors which facilitate the role of 
the unions, exacerbating contradictions and corporate contractual complexities. Thus, in 
geographical areas where legislation and dominant political ideologies are supportive to 
unionization, monitoring costs increase. 
We further demonstrate that in unionized contexts, which are characterized by 
inherently conflicting features, employee participation in corporate ownership operates as an 
alignment mechanism; this, to an extent, alleviates disparities between employee claims and 
other shareholder interests, and reduces the perceived conflict inherent in unionization. 
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Employee participation in ownership reduces contractual relationship complexities, 
information asymmetry and financial opacity, since employees start developing investing 
attitudes. Hence, unionized contexts where employees participate in ownership are assessed as 
less risky and, thus, less time and effort are needed for monitoring purposes. 
The implications of our findings are important for employees, unions, shareholders and 
managers. By providing insights into the positive association between organized labor and 
monitoring costs, unions should take into consideration that their role incurs additional costs 
for the firm; since their mere presence necessitates more thorough, and consequently more 
costly, monitoring activities. Shareholders and managers should consider motivating 
employees to participate in ownership, since this alleviates the underlying contradictions which 
are inherent features of unionization, reduces a significant cost for the firm, and enhances firm 
value. Investors and analysts should factor into their analysis the knowledge that monitoring 
costs are significantly higher in unionized contexts, and particularly in unionized corporations 
located in areas where the legislation and dominant political ideologies are in favor of unions. 
Our research opens up new paths for industrial relations research. We note that our 
study is restricted to the U.S. and, thus, our findings are limited to the specific geographical 
borders. Researchers could study the relationship between unionization and monitoring costs 
in other geographical environments (both European and non-Western) characterized by 
similarities or differences in institutional and industrial settings, unionization cultures and 
histories (see Hui & Chan, 2015). Such research could assist in providing widely-generalizable 
conclusions. Moreover, future research could alternatively employ cross-country samples to 
run the tests and models introduced in this study in order to facilitate the generalizability of 
results.  
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8 Appendix - Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Audit fees model 
Dependent variable: 
LAF Natural logarithm of audit fees (Source: Audit Analytics). 
Unionization status: 
D_UNION 1 if the company's employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, as 
reported in company filings, and 0 otherwise. 
UNION_IND Industry-level unionization, calculated as the product of the percentage of unionized 
employees in the industry (from the Union Membership and Coverage Database (UMCD)) 
with the number of company employees, over lagged total assets, as in Hilary (2006). 
D_UNION_IND 1 if a company's UNION_IND value is greater than the two-digit SIC & year median, 0 
otherwise. 
Client Attributes: 
LTA Natural logarithm of total assets (Source: Compustat). 
FOREIGN 1 if the company reports income taxes from foreign operations (Source: Compustat). 
OPSEG Natural logarithm of the number of operating segments of the company (Source: 
Compustat). 
GEOSEG Natural logarithm of the number of geographic segments of the company (Source: 
Compustat). 
MERGER 1 if the company reports any impact of a merger or acquisition on net income (Source: 
Compustat). 
MB Market to book value of equity (Source: Compustat). 
AGE Age of the company, measured as the natural logarithm of the number of years the 
company has been in Compustat. 
LIT 1 if the company is named as a defendant in a lawsuit, 0 otherwise (Source: Audit 
Analytics). 
ARIN_TA Sum of accounts receivables and inventory, over total assets (Source: Compustat). 
GROWTH Change in company’s sales from previous year over sales of the previous year, expressed 
as percentage (Source: Compustat). 
LOSS 1 if the company's net income is negative, 0 otherwise (Source: Compustat). 
ROA Return on assets, measured as the ratio of income before extraordinary items over total 
assets (Source: Compustat). 
LEV Leverage ratio, measured as total debt over total assets (Source: Compustat). 
CR Current ratio, measured as current assets over current liabilities (Source: Compustat). 
GINDEX Board’s governance strength, as in Srinidhi, et al. (2014). The index is calculated as the 
proportion of nonexecutive board members, plus the average number of other corporate 
affiliations of board members, plus an indicator for the existence of audit committee with 
financial expertise, plus the number of board meetings during the year, minus an indicator 
for CEO serving as chair of the board. Values exceeding 1 are standardized using the 
sample’s max value (Source: Thomson Reuters Eikon). 
CONC_OWN 1 if an investor has at least a 20% stake of total firm shares, 0 otherwise (Source: Thomson 
Reuters Eikon). 
Auditor Attributes: 
LEAD_SIC 1 if the auditor is a market leader, in terms of generating the highest total revenues in an 
industry (two-digit SIC), 0 otherwise (Source: Audit Analytics). 
AUD_CH 1 if the company changed its auditor in current year, 0 otherwise (Source: Audit 
Analytics). 
COMP_AF Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index per audit market (based on auditor's revenue 
in the form of fees), where market is proxied using two-digit SIC-county combinations 
(Source: Audit Analytics). 
Engagement Attributes: 
AUD_LAG Time elapsed from the year-end until the signature date of the auditor (Source: Audit 
Analytics). 
DEC 1 if fiscal year end is December, 0 otherwise (Source: Audit Analytics). 
D_RES 1 if there is a financial statement restatement, 0 otherwise (Source: Audit Analytics). 




Demographic & Geographic Attributes: 
SOC_CAP Social capital at the county level (Jha & Chen, 2015) (Source: Northeast Regional Center 
for Rural Development - Pennsylvania State University). 
DIST_SEC Natural logarithm of the distance between corporate headquarters and the SEC office with 
jurisdiction in the area, in miles. 
POP Natural logarithm of total county population (Source: U.S. Census Bureau). 
LITERACY Percentage of adults completing four years of college or higher in the county (Source: U.S. 
Census Bureau). 
Panel B: Other independent variables for litigation risk model only 
Dependent variable: 
LIT_AUDITOR 1 if the auditor is named as a defendant in a lawsuit, 0 otherwise (Source: Audit Analytics). 
Control variables: 
KMJRDA Abnormal accruals from the modified Jones model, adjusted for performance (Kothari, et 
al., 2005) (Source: Compustat). 
OPCF Operating cash flow over total assets (Source: Compustat). 
ZSCORE Financial distress measurement (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006), calculated as [0.717 
*(working capital / total assets) + 0.847 *(retained earnings / total assets) + 3.107 
*(earnings before interest and taxes / total assets) + 0.42 *(book value of equity / total 
liabilities) + 0.998 *(sales / total assets)] (Source: Compustat). 
INVENTORY Level of inventories over total assets (Source: Compustat). 
REC_TA Total trade accounts receivable over total assets (Source: Compustat). 
RET Company’s 12-month stock returns for the fiscal year (Source: Compustat). 
RETVOL Variance of the company’s abnormal returns during a 12-month period prior to the fiscal 
year end (Source: Compustat). 
UNQOP 1 if the auditor issues an unqualified opinion without any additional language, 
0 otherwise (Source: Compustat). 
 
STENURE 1 if the auditor-client relationship holds for three years or less, 0 otherwise (Source: Audit 
Analytics). 
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Table 1 Sample selection. 
Sample selection stages Number of firms 
Number of 
firm years 
Firms with common support across Audit Analytics, Compustat and 
Thomson Reuters Eikon databases (2003 - 2013). 6,043 49,386 
Delete: Observations of foreign firms. 603 5,099 
Delete: Observations with lack of audit fee control variables for our 
main model (1) and employee figures. 1,910 19,625 
Delete: Firms without ownership structure and corporate governance 
data in Thomson Reuters Eikon. 2,764 19,772 
Delete: Firms belonging to utilities (two-digit SIC 49) and financial 
(two-digit SIC 60-69) sectors. 85 505 
Delete: Observations with lack of union-related expressions in 10-K 
variant filings. 157 1,425 
Delete: Observations of firms audited by non-BIG4 audit firms. 8 50 




Table 2: Descriptive statistics of unionized and non-unionized firms. 
Variable 
Entire Sample 
(N = 2,910) 
Unionized firms 
(N = 1,755) 
Non-Unionized firms  
(N = 1,155) Mean diff. 25th Mean Median 75th StDev 25th Mean Median 75th StDev 25th Mean Median 75th StDev 
AF ($mil) 1.706 4.905 3.136 5.559 5.501 2.465 6.228 4.237 7.028 6.116 1.081 2.894 1.930 3.383 3.565   
LAF 14.35 14.968 14.959 15.53 0.92 14.72 15.284 15.259 15.77 0.832 13.89 14.489 14.473 15.03 0.836 -0.795*** 
D_UNION 0 0.603 1 1 0.489 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 
D_UNION_IND 0 0.547 1 1 0.498 0 0.619 1 1 0.486 0 0.438 0 1 0.496 -0.181*** 
UNION_IND 0 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.005 0 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.006 -0.002*** 
GINDEX 1.179 1.549 1.372 2.08 0.559 1.188 1.521 1.348 2.036 0.541 1.169 1.593 1.44 2.121 0.582 0.072*** 
CONC_OWN 0 0.069 0 0 0.254 0 0.076 0 0 0.265 0 0.059 0 0 0.235 -0.017* 
LTA 7.766 8.581 8.443 9.257 1.144 8.147 8.928 8.763 9.622 1.052 7.371 8.055 7.864 8.69 1.077 -0.873*** 
FOREIGN 1 0.793 1 1 0.405 1 0.821 1 1 0.383 1 0.751 1 1 0.433 -0.070*** 
OPSEG 0 0.481 0 1.099 0.691 0 0.581 0 1.386 0.734 0 0.33 0 0.693 0.588 -0.250*** 
GEOSEG 0 0.61 0 1.386 0.683 0 0.605 0 1.386 0.693 0 0.618 0 1.386 0.666 0.013 
MERGER 0 0.223 0 0 0.416 0 0.236 0 0 0.425 0 0.203 0 0 0.402 -0.033** 
MB 1.707 3.365 2.723 4.371 6.538 1.618 3.039 2.469 3.829 5.683 1.976 3.86 3.252 5.241 7.631 0.821*** 
AGE 2.708 3.191 3.135 3.85 0.672 2.833 3.359 3.584 3.989 0.689 2.565 2.935 2.89 3.296 0.554 -0.424*** 
LIT 0 0.349 0 1 0.477 0 0.337 0 1 0.473 0 0.368 0 1 0.482 0.031* 
ARIN_TA 0.112 0.218 0.201 0.306 0.132 0.134 0.232 0.229 0.317 0.126 0.089 0.196 0.152 0.282 0.139 -0.036*** 
GROWTH -0.127 -0.055 -0.063 0.002 0.166 -0.116 -0.042 -0.052 0.013 0.162 -0.147 -0.075 -0.079 -0.016 0.17 -0.033*** 
LOSS 0 0.12 0 0 0.325 0 0.108 0 0 0.31 0 0.139 0 0 0.347 0.032** 
ROA 0.031 0.059 0.063 0.1 0.087 0.029 0.052 0.055 0.085 0.067 0.037 0.069 0.081 0.125 0.11 0.016*** 
LEV 0.114 0.242 0.223 0.332 0.184 0.164 0.274 0.251 0.353 0.168 0.016 0.192 0.153 0.299 0.195 -0.082*** 
CR 1.255 2.152 1.769 2.562 1.405 1.194 1.829 1.614 2.231 0.928 1.426 2.643 2.07 3.315 1.809 0.813*** 
LEADER_SIC 0 0.339 0 1 0.474 0 0.351 0 1 0.477 0 0.321 0 1 0.467 -0.03* 
AUD_CH 0 0.023 0 0 0.149 0 0.022 0 0 0.146 0 0.024 0 0 0.154 0.003 
COMP_AF 0.93 1.497 1 1.72 1.271 0.938 1.275 1 1.293 0.853 0.921 1.834 1 2.164 1.666 0.558*** 
AUD_LAG 50 54.269 56 59 10.497 50 54.503 56 59 10.067 51 53.915 56 59 11.113 -0.587 
DEC 0 0.666 1 1 0.472 0 0.748 1 1 0.434 0 0.54 1 1 0.499 -0.208*** 
D_RES 0 0.066 0 0 0.249 0 0.071 0 0 0.256 0 0.06 0 0 0.237 -0.011 
SOC_CAP -1.196 -0.593 -0.495 -0.016 0.808 -0.92 -0.464 -0.364 0.106 0.818 -1.401 -0.788 -0.787 -0.261 0.752 -0.324*** 
DIST_SEC 3.285 4.293 4.845 5.577 1.718 3.201 4.333 4.952 5.55 1.718 3.377 4.232 4.606 5.615 1.717 -0.101 
POP 13.18 13.688 13.749 14.32 1.052 13.1 13.583 13.726 14.27 1.1 13.38 13.847 13.96 14.38 0.952 0.264*** 
LITERACY 0.285 0.369 0.362 0.446 0.103 0.28 0.359 0.339 0.44 0.108 0.306 0.384 0.396 0.454 0.093 0.026*** 
LIT_AUDITOR 0 0.007 0 0 0.083 0 0.008 0 0 0.089 0 0.005 0 0 0.072 -0.003 
(continued on next page) 
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(Table 2 continued) 
Variable 
Entire sample 
(N = 2,910) 
Unionized firms 
(N = 1,755) 
Non-Unionized firms  
(N = 1,155) Mean diff. 25th Mean Median 75th StDev 25th Mean Median 75th StDev 25th Mean Median 75th StDev 
ZSCORE 1.824 2.82 2.655 3.739 1.702 1.761 2.552 2.439 3.245 1.249 1.988 3.227 3.241 4.592 2.157 0.675*** 
OPCF 0.069 0.1 0.102 0.142 0.088 0.065 0.091 0.092 0.122 0.067 0.081 0.114 0.124 0.172 0.111 0.024*** 
INVENTORY 0.019 0.103 0.079 0.157 0.101 0.035 0.109 0.095 0.162 0.09 0.004 0.094 0.047 0.14 0.116 -0.015*** 
REC_TA 0.057 0.114 0.104 0.161 0.074 0.069 0.122 0.114 0.168 0.07 0.041 0.101 0.084 0.145 0.079 -0.021*** 
RET -0.064 0.202 0.157 0.393 0.485 -0.051 0.209 0.166 0.391 0.489 -0.09 0.193 0.139 0.394 0.479 -0.016 
RETVOL 0.036 0.115 0.069 0.138 0.153 0.032 0.112 0.062 0.131 0.17 0.044 0.118 0.081 0.147 0.122 0.005 
UNQOP 0 0.595 1 1 0.491 0 0.562 1 1 0.496 0 0.644 1 1 0.479 0.082*** 
STENURE 0 0.169 0 0 0.375 0 0.177 0 0 0.382 0 0.158 0 0 0.365 -0.02 
TECH 0 0.087 0 0 0.282 0 0.023 0 0 0.151 0 0.184 0 0 0.387 0.160*** 
Splits the sample into unionized and non-unionized groups, based on the D_UNION variable at firm-level. The last column compares the differences in mean values of each 
variable across groups and the statistical significance of the differences reported are based on t-tests for continuous variables and chi-square tests for dummy variables. See 
Appendix for variable definitions. 




Table 3 Pearson correlation matrix between LAF, unionization and control variables for audit fee model (N = 2,910). 
Variable LAF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. D_UNION 0.42*** 1.00             
2. GINDEX -0.02 -0.06*** 1.00            
3. CONC_OWN -0.02 0.03* -0.10*** 1.00           
4. LTA 0.71*** 0.37*** -0.08*** 0.02 1.00          
5. FOREIGN 0.33*** 0.09*** 0.05*** -0.02 0.02 1.00         
6. OPSEG 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.07*** 0.01 0.15*** 0.16*** 1.00        
7. GEOSEG 0.08*** -0.01 0.13*** 0.00 -0.02 0.22*** 0.66*** 1.00       
8. MERGER 0.07*** 0.04** 0.09*** -0.01 0.05*** 0.10*** 0.25*** 0.32*** 1.00      
9. MB -0.03 -0.06*** 0.04** 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.08*** -0.03 0.00 1.00     
10. AGE 0.34*** 0.31*** -0.02 -0.14*** 0.33*** 0.05*** 0.13*** 0.02 0.00 -0.02 1.00    
11. LIT 0.17*** -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* 0.23*** 0.01 -0.07*** -0.10*** -0.05*** 0.03* 0.02 1.00   
12. ARIN_TA 0.13*** 0.13*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.09*** 0.15*** 0.03* 0.03 -0.08*** 0.01 0.16*** -0.07*** 1.00  
13. GROWTH 0.15*** 0.10*** 0.03* -0.03* 0.10*** 0.04** -0.01 -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.10*** 0.14*** 0.00 0.06*** 1.00 
14. LOSS -0.05*** -0.05** 0.07*** 0.04** -0.11*** -0.01 -0.04** -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.07*** -0.01 -0.12*** 0.03* 
15. ROA -0.05*** -0.09*** -0.03 -0.05*** -0.03* 0.06*** -0.01 0.01 -0.05*** 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.12*** -0.05** 
16. LEV 0.12*** 0.22*** -0.07*** 0.10*** 0.17*** -0.17*** 0.02 -0.07*** 0.07*** -0.10*** 0.02 -0.02 -0.14*** 0.03 
17. CR -0.33*** -0.28*** 0.09*** -0.02 -0.41*** 0.13*** -0.05*** 0.11*** 0.02 0.01 -0.20*** -0.07*** -0.02 -0.08*** 
18. LEADER_SIC 0.11*** 0.03* -0.02 -0.03 0.09*** 0.05** 0.04** 0.04** 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 
19. AUD_CH -0.05*** -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.02 0.04** -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05** 
20. COMP_AF -0.06*** -0.21*** 0.05*** 0.00 -0.08*** 0.08*** -0.10*** -0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.14*** 0.04** -0.17*** -0.04* 
21. AUD_LAG -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.17*** -0.02 -0.06*** -0.07*** 0.00 -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.04** 0.04** -0.01 
22. DEC 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.02 0.08*** 0.16*** 0.03 0.04** -0.01 0.05*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.04** -0.18*** 0.02 
23. D_RES 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.03* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.06*** -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 
24. SOC_CAP 0.02 0.20*** -0.08*** -0.03 0.07*** -0.03* 0.01 -0.10*** -0.05*** -0.01 0.16*** 0.03 0.09*** 0.02 
25. DIST_SEC -0.10*** 0.03 -0.04** -0.02 -0.01 -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.12*** -0.08*** 0.02 0.13*** -0.02 0.15*** -0.03 
26. POP 0.08*** -0.12*** 0.02 0.01 0.04** 0.06*** -0.03* 0.02 -0.06*** 0.03 -0.12*** 0.05*** -0.11*** -0.02 
27. LITERACY 0.12*** -0.12*** 0.04** -0.06*** 0.02 0.11*** 0.05** 0.09*** 0.05** 0.04** -0.08*** 0.08*** -0.10*** 0.00 
(continued on next page) 
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(Table 3 continued) 
Variable 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
14. LOSS 1.00              
15. ROA -0.67*** 1.00             
16. LEV 0.14*** -0.19*** 1.00            
17. CR 0.07*** 0.06*** -0.27*** 1.00           
18. LEADER_SIC 0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.06*** 1.00          
19. AUD_CH 0.04* -0.04** -0.01 0.00 0.02 1.00         
20. COMP_AF 0.17*** -0.15*** -0.06*** 0.22*** -0.03 0.04** 1.00        
21. AUD_LAG 0.07*** -0.06*** 0.09*** -0.03* 0.01 0.06*** -0.02 1.00       
22. DEC 0.05*** -0.10*** 0.22*** -0.12*** -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.03* 1.00      
23. D_RES 0.05*** -0.05*** 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.15*** -0.01 1.00     
24. SOC_CAP -0.04** 0.02 0.03* -0.14*** 0.06*** -0.01 -0.19*** -0.05** -0.08*** -0.01 1.00    
25. DIST_SEC -0.07*** 0.10*** -0.04** -0.02 -0.04** 0.02 -0.09*** -0.01 -0.06*** 0.00 0.01 1.00   
26. POP 0.03 -0.03 -0.11*** 0.04** -0.09*** 0.01 0.23*** 0.03 -0.03* -0.01 -0.46*** -0.24*** 1.00  
27. LITERACY 0.03 -0.02 -0.04** 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.22*** -0.04** -0.05*** -0.02 0.25*** -0.43*** 0.26*** 1.00 
Note: Values with asterisks *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively (2-tailed). See Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
55 
Table 4 The impact of unionization on audit fees (Dependent variable = LAF), OLS analysis 
Variables Exp sign (1) (2) (3) 
D_UNION ? 0.164***   
  (3.59)   
D_UNION_IND ?  0.127***  
   (4.46)  
UNION_IND ?   8.981** 
    (2.00) 
GINDEX + -0.017 -0.009 -0.012 
  (-0.72) (-0.37) (-0.49) 
CONC_OWN - -0.090 -0.075 -0.072 
  (-1.46) (-1.21) (-1.15) 
LTA + 0.536*** 0.564*** 0.556*** 
  (26.73) (28.46) (28.02) 
FOREIGN + 0.262*** 0.273*** 0.280*** 
  (4.79) (4.95) (5.04) 
OPSEG + 0.009 0.012 0.021 
  (0.39) (0.52) (0.87) 
GEOSEG + 0.050* 0.051* 0.047 
  (1.73) (1.76) (1.64) 
MERGER + 0.006 0.009 0.006 
  (0.20) (0.33) (0.21) 
MB + -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (-1.19) (-1.17) (-1.29) 
AGE ? 0.120*** 0.115*** 0.127*** 
  (4.11) (3.94) (4.31) 
LIT + 0.073*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 
  (3.53) (2.98) (2.92) 
ARIN_TA + 1.405*** 1.348*** 1.451*** 
  (6.82) (6.32) (6.76) 
GROWTH ?+ 0.119** 0.098* 0.119** 
  (2.03) (1.71) (2.00) 
LOSS + 0.051 0.038 0.032 
  (1.10) (0.84) (0.70) 
ROA - -0.303 -0.397* -0.395* 
  (-1.30) (-1.70) (-1.68) 
LEV + 0.044 0.078 0.073 
  (0.34) (0.61) (0.56) 
CR - -0.045*** -0.041*** -0.047*** 
  (-3.39) (-2.98) (-3.48) 
LEADER_SIC + 0.097*** 0.093*** 0.090** 
  (2.78) (2.63) (2.53) 
AUD_CH ?- -0.242** -0.255** -0.245** 
  (-2.43) (-2.51) (-2.42) 
COMP_AF - -0.022 -0.025 -0.027* 
  (-1.40) (-1.64) (-1.73) 
AUD_LAG + 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
  (4.41) (4.73) (4.70) 
DEC + 0.091** 0.102** 0.099** 
  (2.22) (2.51) (2.39) 
D_RES + 0.089** 0.098** 0.092** 
  (2.26) (2.45) (2.34) 
SOC_CAP - -0.088*** -0.074** -0.075** 
  (-3.01) (-2.57) (-2.53) 
(continued on next page) 
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(Table 4 continued) (Dependent variable = LAF), OLS analysis 
Variables Exp sign (1) (2) (3) 
DIST_SEC ?- -0.027** -0.030*** -0.028** 
  (-2.48) (-2.76) (-2.55) 
POP + 0.005 0.009 0.010 
  (0.26) (0.41) (0.46) 
LITERACY + 0.878*** 0.836*** 0.814*** 
  (3.82) (3.66) (3.50) 
(intercept)  8.519*** 8.151*** 8.272*** 
  (24.66) (23.24) (23.42)      
Industry & Year Effects  Included Included Included 
R2  0.794 0.794 0.792 
Adj. R2  0.788 0.788 0.785 
Observations  2,910 2,910 2,910 
Mean VIF  1.519 1.499 1.492 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at firm level, with t-statistics presented in parentheses. Values with asterisks *, 
** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded to 
the third decimal place. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 5 Auditor litigation differences between unionized and non-unionized firms. 
Year Unionized Companies Non-Unionized Companies Difference t-value Auditor Lawsuits Obs % Auditor Lawsuits Obs % 
2003 0 60 0.00% 0 45 0.00% 0.00% - 
2004 2 85 2.35% 0 54 0.00% -2.35% (-1.13) 
2005 1 111 0.90% 0 64 0.00% -0.90% (-0.76) 
2006 4 121 3.31% 2 65 3.08% -0.23% (-0.84) 
2007 2 130 1.54% 0 73 0.00% -1.54% (-1.06) 
2008 1 153 0.65% 1 108 0.93% 0.27% (0.25) 
2009 1 199 0.50% 0 134 0.00% -0.50% (-0.82) 
2010 0 214 0.00% 1 154 0.65% 0.65% (1.18) 
2011 3 231 1.30% 1 158 0.63% -0.67% (0.64) 
2012 0 238 0.00% 0 162 0.00% 0.00% - 
2013 0 213 0.00% 1 138 0.72% 0.72% (1.24) 




Table 6 Auditor litigation as an explanation for variations in audit fees between unionized and non-unionized 
firms (Dependent variable = LIT_AUDITOR), probit analysis. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
D_UNION -0.168 -0.221 -0.232  
(-0.81) (-1.04) (-0.95) 
GINDEX 0.274* 0.304* 0.372**  
(1.81) (1.95) (2.48) 
CONC_OWN 0.639** 0.691*** 1.123**  
(2.55) (2.65) (2.53) 
LTA 0.455*** 0.502*** 0.559***  
(4.29) (4.43) (4.23) 
KMJRDA 0.001 0.359 -1.927  
(0.00) (0.18) (-0.72) 
GROWTH -0.311 -0.400 -0.168  
(-0.57) (-0.71) (-0.28) 
ZSCORE -0.128*** -0.122*** -0.176***  
(-3.56) (-3.58) (-4.42) 
OPCF 2.669 1.853 1.416  
(1.48) (1.13) (0.92) 
INVENTORY 0.071 0.163 3.918**  
(0.07) (0.15) (2.41) 
REC_TA 4.279*** 4.378*** 7.757***  
(3.48) (3.30) (4.01) 
LOSS 0.022 -0.053 -0.207  
(0.06) (-0.14) (-0.48) 
RET -0.164 -0.083 -0.002  
(-0.82) (-0.44) (-0.01) 
RETVOL 0.585 0.919** 0.802*  
(1.42) (2.03) (1.81) 
AUD_LAG 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017***  
(3.46) (2.93) (3.10) 
UNQOP -0.226 -0.020 0.277  
(-1.43) (-0.11) (1.28) 
STENURE 0.404** 0.391* 0.492*  
(2.13) (1.91) (1.84) 
TECH 0.066 0.112 1.105*  
(0.19) (0.32) (1.77) 
SOC_CAP -0.064 -0.135 -0.331*  
(-0.47) (-0.93) (-1.65) 
DIST_SEC 0.016 0.002 -0.015  
(0.21) (0.02) (-0.20) 
POP -0.119 -0.161 -0.392***  
(-1.24) (-1.64) (-3.04) 
LITERACY 0.182 0.692 -0.385  
(0.15) (0.58) (-0.28) 
(intercept) -7.124*** -7.550*** -4.970***  







Pseudo R2 0.232 0.271 0.361 
Observations 2,910 2,405 1,196 
Mean VIF 1.354 1.358 1.392 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at firm level, with z-statistics presented in parentheses. Values with asterisks *, 
** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded to 
the third decimal place. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 7 Audit report lag as an explanation for variations in audit fees between unionized and non-unionized 







































 (9.14)   
Industry & Year Effects Included 
R2 0.229 
Adj. R2 0.207 
Observations 2,910 
Mean VIF 1.232 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at firm level, with t-statistics presented in parentheses. Values with asterisks *, 
** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded to 
the third decimal place. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 8 Unionization and audit fees in states with/without Right-to-Work laws (Dependent variable = LAF), 
OLS analysis. 
Variables Exp sign (1) (2) (3) RTW States Non-RTW States Diff coef 
D_UNION ? 0.144* 0.151*** -0.007*** 
  (1.65) (2.74) (10.908) 
GINDEX + -0.036 -0.024 -0.012 
  (-0.90) (-0.86) (0.067) 
CONC_OWN - 0.026 -0.061 0.087 
  (0.34) (-0.78) (0.733) 
LTA + 0.508*** 0.554*** -0.046 
  (13.22) (26.32) (1.211) 
FOREIGN + 0.116 0.327*** -0.211** 
  (1.62) (4.35) (4.679) 
OPSEG + 0.015 0.008 0.006 
  (0.39) (0.29) (0.022) 
GEOSEG + 0.048 0.033 0.015 
  (1.16) (0.92) (0.079) 
MERGER + 0.051 -0.026 0.077 
  (1.15) (-0.81) (2.243) 
MB + -0.000 -0.001 0.001 
  (-0.03) (-0.71) (0.073) 
AGE ? 0.184*** 0.087** 0.097* 
  (4.08) (2.53) (3.198) 
LIT + 0.085*** 0.074*** 0.011 
  (2.91) (3.09) (0.089) 
ARIN_TA + 1.161*** 1.485*** -0.324 
  (2.78) (7.13) (0.55) 
GROWTH ?+ 0.166* 0.093 0.073 
  (1.89) (1.30) (0.453) 
LOSS + 0.055 0.059 -0.004 
  (0.66) (1.11) (0.002) 
ROA - -0.298 -0.391 0.093 
  (-0.87) (-1.57) (0.052) 
LEV + 0.167 0.047 0.12 
  (0.88) (0.31) (0.268) 
CR - 0.006 -0.054*** 0.06** 
  (0.21) (-3.57) (4.202) 
LEADER_SIC + 0.096* 0.105*** -0.009 
  (1.68) (2.70) (0.018) 
AUD_CH ?- 0.168** -0.427*** 0.595*** 
  (2.01) (-3.23) (15.286) 
COMP_AF - 0.088* -0.028* 0.117** 
  (1.97) (-1.73) (6.562) 
AUD_LAG + 0.006*** 0.007*** -0.001 
  (3.71) (4.53) (0.291) 
DEC + 0.138* 0.040 0.097 
  (1.87) (0.87) (1.413) 
D_RES + -0.013 0.112** -0.125* 
  (-0.26) (2.33) (3.471) 
SOC_CAP - 0.014 -0.068** 0.082 
  (0.23) (-2.01) (1.624) 
DIST_SEC ?- -0.074*** -0.039*** -0.035 
  (-3.23) (-3.25) (1.984) 
(continued on next page) 
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(Table 8 continued) (Dependent variable = LAF), OLS analysis 
Variables Exp sign (1) (2) (3) RTW States Non-RTW States Diff coef 
POP + 0.009 0.036 -0.026 
  (0.29) (1.51) (0.446) 
LITERACY + 0.715* 0.763*** -0.048 
  (1.94) (3.11) (0.013) 
(intercept)  8.702*** 8.086*** 0.828 
  (17.19) (19.49) (1.249)      
Industry & Year Effects  Included Included  
R2  0.856 0.812  
Adj. R2  0.841 0.804  
Observations  888 2,022  
Mean VIF   1.605 1.553  
Note: Standard errors are clustered at firm level, with t-statistics presented in parentheses. Values with asterisks *, 
** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded to 
the third decimal place. The last column reports the t-statistics for Wald tests used to compare the difference in 
coefficients between regression results. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 9 Unionization and audit fees in states (counties) where Democrats (Republicans) won in recent 
presidential elections (Dependent variable = LAF), OLS analysis. 
Variables Exp sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
State-Level County-Level 
Democrats Republicans Diff coef Democrats Republicans Diff coef 
D_UNION ? 0.186*** 0.115 0.071*** 0.154*** 0.150* 0.004*** 
  (3.55) (1.61) (13.826) (3.07) (1.72) (12.077) 
GINDEX + -0.022 -0.004 -0.018 -0.030 0.012 -0.042 
  (-0.69) (-0.12) (0.186) (-1.14) (0.24) (0.682) 
CONC_OWN - -0.109 0.008 -0.118 -0.116 0.161 -0.277** 
  (-1.45) (0.10) (1.352) (-1.63) (1.33) (4.372) 
LTA + 0.536*** 0.542*** -0.006 0.546*** 0.503*** 0.043 
  (24.15) (16.79) (0.031) (26.22) (12.01) (1.008) 
FOREIGN + 0.265*** 0.212*** 0.054 0.270*** 0.213* 0.058 
  (3.81) (3.37) (0.411) (4.53) (1.75) (0.211) 
OPSEG + 0.051* -0.029 0.08 0.010 0.007 0.003 
  (1.76) (-0.65) (2.385) (0.39) (0.12) (0.003) 
GEOSEG + 0.025 0.067 -0.042 0.062* -0.011 0.074 
  (0.70) (1.38) (0.533) (1.90) (-0.18) (1.241) 
MERGER + 0.000 0.026 -0.026 -0.026 0.121** -0.147** 
  (0.01) (0.48) (0.187) (-0.86) (2.21) (6.434) 
MB + -0.002 -0.006 0.004 -0.002 -0.004 0.002 
  (-1.45) (-0.92) (0.355) (-1.27) (-0.74) (0.171) 
AGE ? 0.097*** 0.130*** -0.033 0.114*** 0.166** -0.053 
  (2.79) (3.38) (0.598) (3.54) (2.44) (0.567) 
LIT + 0.062** 0.109*** -0.047 0.081*** 0.041 0.04 
  (2.54) (3.65) (1.739) (3.77) (1.05) (0.983) 
ARIN_TA + 1.514*** 0.943** 0.571 1.467*** 1.047*** 0.42 
  (7.32) (2.46) (2.147) (6.89) (2.75) (1.142) 
GROWTH ?+ 0.083 0.167** -0.084 0.125* 0.193 -0.069 
  (1.05) (2.01) (0.622) (1.82) (1.38) (0.208) 
LOSS + 0.050 0.014 0.036 0.045 -0.014 0.059 
  (0.89) (0.20) (0.19) (0.86) (-0.16) (0.381) 
ROA - -0.373 0.004 -0.376 -0.349 -0.633* 0.284 
  (-1.37) (0.01) (1.045) (-1.35) (-1.70) (0.438) 
LEV + -0.064 0.370* -0.434** 0.130 -0.030 0.159 
  (-0.44) (1.94) (4.445) (0.91) (-0.13) (0.417) 
CR - -0.012 -0.081*** 0.068*** -0.041** -0.037 -0.004 
  (-0.84) (-3.75) (8.878) (-2.46) (-1.51) (0.024) 
LEADER_SIC + 0.074* 0.110** -0.036 0.103*** 0.076 0.027 
  (1.82) (2.22) (0.441) (2.66) (1.20) (0.163) 
AUD_CH ?- -0.145 -0.508** 0.363 -0.412*** 0.022 -0.434** 
  (-1.32) (-2.29) (2.279) (-3.11) (0.17) (5.819) 
COMP_AF - -0.018 -0.020 0.002 -0.038** 0.046 -0.084 
  (-0.91) (-1.03) (0.007) (-2.31) (0.81) (2.383) 
AUD_LAG + 0.006*** 0.005*** 0 0.006*** 0.007*** -0.001 
  (3.10) (3.05) (0.041) (3.87) (3.14) (0.064) 
DEC + 0.077* 0.059 0.018 0.085* 0.174** -0.089 
  (1.67) (1.02) (0.086) (1.81) (2.00) (0.927) 
D_RES + 0.057 0.172*** -0.115 0.095** 0.080 0.015 
  (1.25) (2.59) (2.127) (2.15) (1.07) (0.035) 
SOC_CAP - -0.100*** -0.044 -0.057 -0.082** -0.178** 0.097 
  (-2.94) (-0.95) (1.325) (-2.48) (-2.48) (1.669) 
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(Table 9 continued) (Dependent variable = LAF), OLS analysis 
Variables Exp sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
State-Level County-Level 
Democrats Republicans Diff coef Democrats Republicans Diff coef 
DIST_SEC ?- -0.026** -0.045** 0.019 -0.030** 0.006 -0.036 
  (-2.05) (-2.56) (0.98) (-2.56) (0.20) (1.501) 
POP + 0.005 0.024 -0.019 0.014 -0.035 0.049 
  (0.20) (0.86) (0.36) (0.49) (-0.90) (1.136) 
LITERACY + 0.955*** 0.883** 0.072 0.857*** 0.925** -0.069 
  (3.89) (2.30) (0.034) (3.23) (2.10) (0.021) 
(intercept)  8.616*** 8.412*** 1.015** 8.420*** 8.711*** -0.83 
  (20.66) (17.85) (3.99) (17.53) (12.85) (1.113) 
         
Industry & Year Effects Included Included   Included Included  
R2  0.792 0.839   0.808 0.813  
Adj. R2  0.782 0.824   0.8 0.789  
Observations  1,906 1,004   2,212 698  
Mean VIF   1.533 1.627   1.540 1.663   
Note: Standard errors are clustered at firm level, with t-statistics presented in parentheses. Values with asterisks *, 
** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded to 
the third decimal place. The last column reports the t-statistics for Wald tests used to compare the difference in 
coefficients between regression results. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 10 Unionization, employee share ownership (ESO) and audit fees (Dependent variable = LAF), OLS 
analysis. 
Variables Exp sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Unionized Non-Unionized Full Sample Full Sample 
ESO ? -0.331** -0.081 -0.305** -0.290** 
  (-2.11) (-0.23) (-2.13) (-2.09) 
D_UNION ?    0.124** 
     (2.53) 
GINDEX + -0.022 0.026 -0.012 -0.013 
  (-0.69) (0.71) (-0.46) (-0.49) 
CONC_OWN - -0.135 0.063 -0.106 -0.120 
  (-1.45) (0.65) (-1.25) (-1.43) 
LTA + 0.588*** 0.481*** 0.542*** 0.532*** 
  (20.46) (16.54) (24.48) (24.36) 
FOREIGN + 0.182** 0.342*** 0.290*** 0.281*** 
  (2.25) (4.36) (4.58) (4.47) 
OPSEG + -0.001 0.005 0.011 0.004 
  (-0.04) (0.14) (0.42) (0.14) 
GEOSEG + 0.035 0.026 0.038 0.040 
  (0.75) (0.54) (1.17) (1.22) 
MERGER + -0.048 0.039 -0.005 -0.007 
  (-1.29) (1.01) (-0.16) (-0.24) 
MB + 0.001 -0.007* -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.43) (-1.80) (-0.93) (-0.89) 
AGE ? 0.157*** 0.210*** 0.193*** 0.185*** 
  (3.41) (3.63) (5.31) (5.21) 
LIT + 0.053** 0.063* 0.049** 0.057*** 
  (2.12) (1.90) (2.18) (2.60) 
ARIN_TA + 1.395*** 1.581*** 1.456*** 1.391*** 
  (4.97) (6.78) (7.09) (7.15) 
GROWTH ?+ 0.171 0.168* 0.165** 0.160** 
  (1.60) (1.72) (2.38) (2.31) 
LOSS + 0.081 0.100 0.047 0.059 
  (1.35) (1.18) (0.96) (1.18) 
ROA - -0.486 -0.317 -0.475** -0.418* 
  (-1.45) (-1.04) (-2.09) (-1.84) 
LEV + -0.331* 0.063 -0.022 -0.039 
  (-1.84) (0.35) (-0.16) (-0.28) 
CR - -0.064** -0.037** -0.056*** -0.051*** 
  (-2.37) (-2.24) (-4.21) (-3.77) 
LEADER_SIC + 0.112** 0.045 0.098** 0.101*** 
  (2.28) (0.84) (2.57) (2.69) 
AUD_CH ?- -0.096 -0.307* -0.198 -0.197 
  (-0.53) (-1.71) (-1.55) (-1.55) 
COMP_AF - -0.022 -0.015 -0.034** -0.030* 
  (-0.89) (-0.69) (-2.06) (-1.83) 
AUD_LAG + 0.004** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
  (2.59) (4.25) (4.13) (3.94) 
DEC + 0.119* 0.100 0.122*** 0.113** 
  (1.95) (1.48) (2.74) (2.56) 
D_RES + 0.083 0.157** 0.097** 0.094* 
  (1.52) (2.06) (2.03) (1.96) 
SOC_CAP - -0.112*** -0.089* -0.074** -0.089*** 
  (-3.04) (-1.77) (-2.40) (-2.89) 
(continued on next page) 
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(Table 10 continued) (Dependent variable = LAF), OLS analysis 
Variables Exp sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Unionized Non-Unionized Full Sample Full Sample 
DIST_SEC ?- -0.032* -0.013 -0.025** -0.023* 
  (-1.92) (-0.68) (-1.98) (-1.83) 
POP + -0.013 0.027 0.005 0.002 
  (-0.46) (0.82) (0.21) (0.08) 
LITERACY + 1.101*** 0.368 0.686*** 0.770*** 
  (3.54) (0.90) (2.66) (3.02) 
(intercept)  8.393*** 7.702*** 8.165*** 8.183*** 
  (18.08) (15.42) (20.44) (20.97)       
Industry & Year Effects  Included Included Included Included 
R2  0.796 0.797 0.804 0.806 
Adj. R2  0.783 0.779 0.796 0.798 
Observations  1,357 879 2,236 2,236 
Mean VIF   1.566 1.509 1.505 1.521 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at firm level, with t-statistics presented in parentheses. Values with asterisks *, 
** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded to 
the third decimal place. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
